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Show must comply with the procedural requirements to the fullest extent possible. The same Circuit in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 14$ U. S.App.D.C. 5, 458 F.2d 827 (1972), has said that the procedural requirements are not intended to be a straitjacket or to demand what is, fairly speaking, not meaningfully possible. Finally, the most recent decision of the D. C. Circuit, Scientists' Institute for Public Information, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Commission, D.C.Cir., 481 F.2d 1079, 1973, expounds the standards more clearly than earlier decisions: It is apparent, however, that the Commission seeks to avoid issuing its forthcoming "environmental survey" as an impact statement under "Section 102, not out ox any desire to circumvent NEPA's procedural requirements, b\A rather because of a fear that Section 102,s requirements as to the contents of an impact statement are so strict, particularly as to the need for "detail'' m the statement, that any Commission attempt to issue its envi- 1 OnuicuUll bull -•> ati '-- i ' t.-'j- -•• aiovc msnt would be d o hed to failure. While we do not altogether understand the Commission's fo&rs, we feel they are based on certain misapprehensions . as to what NEPA requires. :corvd*mir- n-V if the Commission's environmental survey is prepared and issued in accordance with N.E-PA procedures, and if the Commission makes . The cases cited !>>:' the trial court as calling "for a "CRreful review" of agency action in environmental eases <U' not support the trial court's use of the "r.r'<ii.rr-\rv and capricious standard in assessing the factual adequacy of: .'.:: impact statement. Calvert Vfiffn' did not involve the review oT an lin-pact siatfuuout. Scenic Hu-iliQn was concerned \v\th the a«*e-sjuaey of an xsw.cy'* decision, not the adequacy of the impact statement contributing to that decision. N'.R.D.C v. ilorton dealt with cy's i; roente cy Ua ih'^n. !::.• legal que i-?act staten (I no s;;ccif D.D.F. v i t to s ;'; c U 6f " could }f Ci V >rps. vita ex{ 3GCU of to ~-: ? -'.n le en !' the i en u "..';; t ie PgCtt vi con H'v.'tL emeu : rs 1 a good faith effort in the survey to describe the reasonably foreseeable environmental impact of the program, alternatives to the program and their reasonably foreseeable environmental impact, and the irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources the J program involves, we see no reason / why the survey will not fully satisfy / 1 the requirements of Section 102(C). j The environmental impact statement should be placed in perspective. The : relevant provisions bring environmental factors into the agency decision-making placing them on an equal footing with economic, technical and other considerations. Also, this environmental impact statement serves as source material for the head of the agency, the Congress, the President and the public. .Sec Calvert Cliffs', supra. If the agency had failed altogether to follow uul-the fnoceoTire"'required by NEPA. tne arbi- •'trary"ahll capricious standard might \vel 1 applw That is not our present problem. The rule of reason is a more appropriate standard where the sufficiency of tH statement is being tested.5 <Jftro<\. ^ i ^ - ^ 8 « y\X\1 In summary, then, our view h that the review of FES is limited to the following: (1) Whether FES discusses all of the five procedural xrnvp A reauiremeu'cs (2) Whether the environmental impact statement constitutes an objective good faith compliance with the demands of NEPA. somewhat confusing in its discussion of in standard oe review. Careful examination e! the case reveals, however, that the la&gnaS^ about using tlve "arbitrary and eaprieiou.-- test refers TO review of agency dedsio-! rather than the (tactual sufficiency of im*1-"' statements. The court actusliy adopted ••-' "rule of ro.\-^*i" test which we have u*-'r approved when it assessed the tue-ruat »«#' ciency of the agency's compliance with • 10ii(.2)(D) of NK''.\. 170 TY!d at 297- •"' similar test would presumably be appl&d • •' th'ot court in assessing the factual ad«rua .• of other procedural requirements tinder 102, including preparation of the imPac" statement. (3) Whether the sti reasonable discus.-•-*•. matter involved in areas. • ' III. I The remaining is~v\ one in the case pertairj of the Final Environ: testing it by the five set forth in § 4332(2)( [12,13] As a prefel there is some dispute comments which were ous agencies and instil the draft environmental sent are to be regarded Final Statement. The l| ited, received and cons: from many interested z\ the plaintiffs-appellees. that the various comme: considered as a part of ment. However, we i were incorporated into ment and were availab tion by all interested available for the infoi President, the Congress These commenting inekp agencies within the tncs-jr] and ten other federal age I the National Science Fots Energy Commission, X tics and Space Administl En vi r on mental Protect: o: addition, there were- com.' states, various scientific number of business and stitutions. Moreover, th ronmentai Statement sh comments were considers thsrs of the statement, that the comments are fc? an integral part of the s' Con. Council of N. Car. v. F.Supp. 222 (MJD.N.C.i# ronmentrd D. Fund, Ire- En g. of United States Supp. 1211, 12(7, (E.D-i In general, the tiistrie fault with the fact that th ;«»»l«»S!SiS«J5ibS'aEiSM |
