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Show LliW 0 of which must be balanced by the decision- maker. The issue of scope of judicial review must be divided into two parts: first, the review of the Final Environmental Statement (FES), second, the review o" the action of the Secretary terminating the contracts. See Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 10 Cir., 484 F.2d 1244, p. 1249, n. 5. I believe that different standards apply to each part. Treject, and I believe that the majority opinion rejects, the apparent holdings lot the Eighth and Fourth Circuits that an environmental statement is judicially reviewable on its merits to determine ; sufficiency. See Environmental Defense Fund v. Corns of Engineers of United States Army, 3 Cir., 470 F.2d 2S3, 298, and Conservation Council of North Carolina v. Froealke, 4 Cir... 473 F.2a 664, 665. I believe that judicial review of an impact statement is limited to a determination of whether the statement is a good faith, objective, and reasonable presentation ox the subject areas man- • dated by NEPA. The courts should not second-guess the scientists, experts,, economists, and planners who make the environmental statement. In my ooinion FES is an excellent job which fully complies with both the letter and the spirit of NEPA, It is a comprehensive study which displays objectivity and good faith. Its discussion reasonably presents the environmental effects, the alternatives, the relationship between short-term and long-term uses of man's environment, and the possible-economic effects. TJijs_brings me to the sfinord question. iucdclIaT review of the .S^r^j-rwy's "rtion terminating the contracts. Here the BtflTuIard, is that provided by the APA. The statement of the Secretary at termination of the contracts shows that in accordance with NEPA he carefully reviewed FES. His action was not a mechanical compliance with NEPA but rather a full consideration of FES with an understanding and raasonable. application of its comprehensive study. He balanced the environmental factors with the other pertinent factors. His final action was neither arbitrary, capricious, nor an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the district court's injunction was improper, w " • One other point should be mentioned. Neither the statements of the trial court nor of this court determine the contractual rights of the parties, whatever they may be. Those are for consideration by the Court of Claims under the Tucker Act. I*el*w 3. 33EXhfAN", Secretary o? Labor, United SWIMS JXepartmenfc of Labor, Plaintiff-Appellant, SUGx\iv. CAXE GBOWEBS COOPERATIVE OF FLOKXDA and Kobert Lee, ••••Defendants-Appellees. . N o . 72-34GD. United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. Oct. 25, 1973. From adverse decision of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Charles B. Fulton. Chief Judge, 346 F.Supp. 132, as to applicability of overtime provisions oi Fair Labor Standards Act, Secretary oi Labor appealed. The Court of Appeals Simpson, Circuit Judge, held that work done hy West Indians, who prepare-meals for sugar cane field laborers aw-maintained barracks and appurtenant facilities used by laborers, was "on a farrn within exemption for practices performed on a farm incident to or in con-, junction with farming operations aa-that sugar cane processor's boiler r<ww employees were engaged in nonexcaw work and thus were not exempt as ew |
