Sierra Club v. Gilbert Stamm and other legal cases involving environmental impact statements

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816 91 SUPREME COURT REPORTER 401 U.S. 402 lie park was entitled to presumption of explaining their action. Department of regularity. Department of Transporta- Transportation Act, § 4(f), 49 U.SCA tion Act, § 4(f), 49 U.S.C.A. § 1653(f); § 1653(f); 23 U.S.C.A. § 138. 23 U.S.C.A. § 138. 11. United States C=>82 Absence of formal findings by Sec­retary of Transportation authorizing use of federal funds for construction of ex­pressway through public park did not re­quire that case be remanded to Secretary even though Department of Transporta­tion regulation issued subsequent to Sec­retary's decision required Secretary to make formal findings, inasmuch as change in circumstances had occurred since Secretary's decision and there was an administrative record that would al­low full, prompt review of Secretary's action. Department of Transportation Act, § 4(f), 49 U.S.C.A. § 1653(f); 23 U.S.C.A. § 138; Executive Order No. 11514, 42 U.S.C.A. § 4321 note. 12. United States C=>82 Litigation affidavits containing "post hoc" rationalizations were an in­adequate basis for review of decision of Secretary of Transportation authorizing the use of federal funds for construc­tion of expressway through public park. Department of Transportation Act, § 4 (f), 49 U.S.C.A. § 1653(f); 23 U.S.C.A. § 138. 13. Administrative Law and Procedure 0753 Inquiry into the mental processes of administrative decision makers is usually to be avoided and there must be a strong showing of bad faith or improper be­havior before such inquiry may be made. 14. United States C=82 Court reviewing action of Secretary of Transportation authorizing use of fed­eral funds for construction of express­way through public park could require the administrative officials who partici­pated in the decision to give testimony * The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been pre­pared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See Unit- - Syllabus* Under § 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act of 1966 and § 133 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968 the Secretary of Transportation may not authorize use of federal funds to finance construction of highways through public parks if a "feasible and prudent" alterna­tive route exists. If no such route is available, he may approve construction only if there has been "all possible plan­ning to minimize harm" to the park. Petitioners contend that the Secretary has violated these statutes by authoriz­ing a six-lane interstate highway through a Memphis public park. In April 1968 the Secretary announced that he agreed with the local officials that the highway go through the park; in September 1969 the State acquired the right-of-way inside the park; and in November 1969 the Secretary announced final approval, including the design, of the road. Neither announcement of the Secretary was accompanied by factual findings. Respondents introduced affi­davits in the District Court, indicating that the Secretary had made the deci­sion and that it was supportable. Peti­tioners filed counter affidavits and sought to take the deposition of a former federal highway administrator. The Dis­trict Court and the Court of Appeals found that formal findings were not re­quired and refused to order the deposi­tion of the former administrator. Both courts held that the affidavits afforded no basis for determining that the Secre­tary exceeded his authority. Held: 1. The Secretary's action is subject to judicial review pursuant to § 701 of the Administrative Procedure Act. Pp- 820-821, ed States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co.. 200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 2S7. DO L.Ed. 499.