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Show 540 Court has said that Congress intended to establish a rule that for the future the land should be patented separately, and that "all non-navigable waters thereon should be reserved for the use of the public under the laws of the states and territories named."254 This statute:255 simply recognizes and gives sanction, in so far as the United States and its future grantees are concerned, to the state and local doctrine of appropriation, and seeks to remove what otherwise might be an impediment to its full and successful operation. The effect of the recognition accorded by these statutes to the doctrine of appropriation so far as they concern public lands is subject to certain qualifications, as is apparent from several decisions of the Supreme Court.256 Thus, unless au- thorized by Congress:257 a State cannot by its legislation destroy the right of the United States, as the owner of lands bordering on a stream, to the continued flow of its waters; so far at least as may be necessary for the beneficial uses of the government property. Nor did Congress by the Acts of 1866, 1870, and 1877 intend "to release its control over the navigable streams of the coun- try" or to grant the right "to appropriate the waters on the sources of navigable streams to such an extent as to destroy their navigability."258 When it later held the Colorado River to be a navigable stream of the United States, the Supreme Court in 1936 said:259 The privilege of the states through which it flows and their inhabitants to appropriate and use the water is subject to the paramount power of the United States to control it for the purpose of improving navigation. 254 California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U. S. 142,162 (1935). 256 295 U. S. at 164. 25a See supra, pp. 38-42. 267 United States v. Rio Grande Irrigation Co., 174 U. S. 690, 703 (1899). 288174 U. S. at 706. 269 Arizona v. California, 298 U. S. 558, 569 (1936). |