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Show 668 SOUTH CAROLINA son v. Williams?* where the court emphasized the following con- siderations: the water must flow in a particular direction, although not necessarily continuously; there must be a well-defined bed or channel with banks; ordinarily the stream must discharge itself into some other stream or body of water; the origin of the water is not determinative because surface waters often flow into a natural water- course ; and the actual volume of water is not decisive.85 On the basis of these considerations, one might well question some of the early cases. In one, the court held that a watercourse was in- volved where the defendant discharged raw sewage from a manu- facturing plant employing over 200 people into a "stream" which was "10 to 12 inches broad in its natural flow" and which failed to convey the fecal matter until the volume of the stream was increased by rain- fall, at which time the plaintiff's land was flooded.36 In another case, the mere presence of catfish in the water did not conclusively establish a watercourse in view of "the well-established habit of certain species of the family of traveling long distances over dryland.37 And, while it has been suggested that an artificial ditch cannot be a water- course,38 in the Johnson case such a ditch was regarded as a water- course where it connected two quite large natural bodies of water. Overflow of flood water may or may not be a watercourse, depending upon its pattern of movement after it leaves the channel.39 It is doubtful whether the question of navigability or nonnaviga- bility-which relates primarily to public regulation and to title problems-has much to do with the exisence of riparian rights or their extent in South Carolina.40 Riparian rights on a navigable stream may, of course, be subject to navigation servitudes of either the State or the Federal Government. Focusing more specifically on reasonable use limitations, it must be said that the scope of the riparian privilege remains somewhat uncertain in South Carolina. Are any uses unreasonable per se? At an early date, the court quoted from Chancellor Kent:41 Streams of water are intended for the use and comfort of man: and it would be unreasonable and contrary to the universal sense of mankind to debar every riparian proprietor from the application of the water to domestic, agricultural and manufacturing purposes. Under the general reasonable use approach adopted by the court, domestic uses have no special preference over other uses. Agricultural uses (irrigation) have not come before the court, no doubt because irrigation uses are very limited and water during most years has been plentiful in the State. In one case, water in a stream was completely consumed for the purpose of cultivating rice, but the court did not M338 S.C. 623, 121 S.E. 2d 223 (1961). « Bradenberg v. Zeigler, 62 S.C. 18, 39 S.E. 790 (1901). a»Lowe v. Ottaray Mills, 93 S.C. 420, 77 S.E. 135 (1912). It should be noted that counsel for the defendant did not actually contend that a watercourse was not in- volved. Even if surface water was involved, there was probably a private nuisance. v Rivenbark v. Atlantic Coast Line B.R., 124 S.E. 136, 117 S.E. 206 (1923). a»See Lawton v. South Bound R.R., 61 S.C. 548, 39 S.E. 752 (1901). »Jones v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 67 S.C. 181, 45 S.E. 188 (1903). *° But see E. Guerard, The Riparian Rights Doctrine in South Carolina, 23 S.C. L. Rev. 757, 760-62 (1969). 41 White v. Whitney Mfg. Co., 60 S.C. 254, 38 S.E. 456 (1901). |