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Show 492 NEW HAMPSHIRE What is "reasonable" is a question of fact to be determined from the nature of the specific stream being evaluated.48 The size and character of the stream must be considered and the uses to which it can be applied,49 but the rule is flexible and suited to the growing and changing needs of the community.50 It appears that water can be used for virtually any purpose as long as the use is reasonable. Some of the uses recognized by the New Hampshire court include domestic, agricultural, manufactur- ing,51 and power generation.52 3.3 Changes, Sales, and Transfers Riparian rights are usually transferred as an appurtenance of the riparian land, but a riparian owner may convey his right, or a por- tion thereof, independent of his real property.53 Such a transfer is subject to the usual rules governing the interpretation of deeds, and any limitation on the right conveyed must be clear from the deed itself.54 Unless expressly limited by the deed, the water may be used for purposes other than the use existing at the time of the conveyance.55 In doubtful cases, the grant is construed to limit only the quantity of water, and not the purpose of use.56 However, in the grant of a water right it will be presumed that the parties intended that any use be reasonable, since this is the extent of, and a limitation on, the grantor's right.57 3.4 Loss of Bights Riparian rights are not subject to forfeiture, nor is there an abandonment of a right by the mere nonuse of the water.58 However, the right of a riparian owner may be lost to another under the doctrine of adverse possession, but in order to establish such a right the use must exist throughout the prescriptive period.59 And the use must be adverse, exclusive, and uninterrupted.60 The New Hampshire court has concluded that where the facts show that one riparian owner has voluntarily limited his right and another riparian owner has relied upon this limitation while expending funds to construct improvements, the doctrine of estoppel will pre- vent the former from reasserting his rights.61 *8 Chapman v. Newmarket Mfg. Co., 74 N.H. 424, 68 Atl. 868 (1908) ; Gillls v. Chase, 67 N.H. 161, 31 Atl. 18 (1891). & Poire v. Serra, 99 N.H. 154. 106 A. 2d 391 (1954). 60 Poire v. Serra, 99 N.H. 154, 106 A. 2d 391 (1954). 51 Gerrish v. New Market Man. Co., 30 N.H. 478 (1854). 52Lancaster & Jefferson Electric Light Co. v. Jones, 75 N.H. 172, 71 Atl. 871 (1909). ^Gillis v. Chase, 67 N.H. 161, 31 Atl. 18 (1891). B*Lancaster &Jefferson Electric Light Co. v. Jones, 75 N.H. 172, 71 Atl. 871 (1909). « Essex Co. v. Gibson, 82 N.H. 139, 130 Atl. 846 (1925). saDewey v. Williams, 40 N.H. 222 (1860) ; Essex Co. v. Gibson, 82 N.H. 139, 130 Atl. 846 (1925). ^ Essex Co. v. Gibson, 82 N.H. 139, 130 Atl. 846 (1925). MWhitcher v. State, 87 N.H. 405, 181 Atl. 549 (1935) ; Gagnon v. Carrier, 96 N.H. 409, 77 A. 2d 868 (1951). MTaggert v. Jaffrey, 75 N.H. 473, 76 Atl. 123 (1910). 60 Norway Plains Co. v. Bradley, 52 N.H. 86 (1872) ; Bullen v. Runnels, 2 N.H. 255 (1820). ^Taggert v. Jaffrey, 75 N.H. 473, 76 Atl. 123 (1910). |