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Show GEORGIA 231 from said canal for the purpose of propelling machinery, irrigating lands, furnishing water for drinking, fire, or any other purpose that the board of directors may deem proper at any points along the line of the same, and charge for the use of said water.85 Navigation companies may also be organized on petition of five or more persons,26 and their principal powers relate to conveying "per- sons, vessels, and property by the use of stream, sail, or other means, and to receive compensation therefor;"27 and erecting and maintain- ing "buildings, wharves, docks, fixtures, and machinery for the ac- commodation and use of * * * passengers, freight, and other busi- ness." 28 3. Surface Waters 3.1 Method of Acquiring Bights Since Georgia has no system of appropriation or permits, and recognizes water rights only in conjunction with ownership of riparian land, water rights can only be acquired by acquiring riparian land or by separate conveyances creating rights of water use. However, certain water uses over a prolonged period may result in a prescriptive right to continue the use, even though it would other- wise be unreasonable, and in a sense this can be deemed an acquisition of a water use right, although it is discussed in this chapter under section 3.4 dealing with loss of water rights. 3.2 Nature and Limit of Rights a. Hendrick v. Cook The landmark case in Georgia on riparian rights is Hendrick v. Cook,29 decided in 1848. There the plaintiff sued the defendants for damages when the latter built a dam which raised the natural water level of a stream nearly a foot, thereby destroying the potential value of the plaintiff's mill-shoal above. The sole issue was whether the plaintiff had a cause of action in trespass. The defendants first argued that the obstruction was privileged because of their prior appropria- tion of the water. This was expressly rejected by the court, ap- parently on the theory that it was bound by the common law natural flow theory. The court was careful to point out that the riparian owner's right to make a reasonable use of the water for domestic, agricultural, or manufacturing purposes is qualified by similar rights of other riparians. What the court seemed to adopt was a natural flow theory qualified by reasonable rights of other riparians to use the water. Important in the case was the statement that the plaintiff need not show damage to a present use of the water as an element of his cause of action. This was felt to be necessary to prevent the running of the period of prescription. If this were a case of first impression today, it is doubtful whether unused riparian rights would be pro- s'5 Sec. 17-109. 29 Sec. 17-202. "Sec. 17-212(2). 2s Sec. 17-212(3). 29 4 Ga. 421 (184S). |