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Show 574 NORTH CAROLINA for profit, and even if the use deteriorates quality, so long as such use is reasonable under all the circumstances.41 Professor Aycock, in discussing riparian rights in North Caro- lina, classifies the cases according to disputes over diversions, de- tentions, or accelerations of the flow, and pollution. In the cases dealing with diversion for commercial purposes, he finds a rela- tively lenient attitude toward industrial uses.42 On the other hand, the court has looked much more strictly at diversions for municipal water supplies.43 Here damages are allowed although injunctive relief is given reluctantly. In effect, the municipality is condemning an easement. Questions relating to detentions, acceleration in the flow, or back- ups usually have arisen because of the construction of dams. Much, of course, depends upon whether the use of the water has some utilitarian value in the particular case. Here again considerable latitude is accorded industrial uses, and injunctions are not often issued.44 In the pollution cases, the cause of action is often couched in terms of either "nuisance" or "continuing trespass." The theory apparently doesn't make much difference, however.45 Here again, what is reasonable is difficult to predict, but as Aycock points out, the court is reluctant to enjoin even polluters.46 Occasionally, the pollution suit is brought under a local statute.47 3.3 Changes, Sales, and Transfers Under the Water Use Act, water permits are not transferable without the approval of the Board.48 This is not particularly im- portant because they are also revocable by the Board on a 60-day notice. Riparian rights, unless expressly reserved, are transferred with the conveyance of riparian land. 3.4 Loss of Rights Riparian rights probably may be acquired by a nonriparian owner by prescription.49 A prescriptive right to maintain a dam which floods an upper riparian may be acquired by prescription in North Carolina.50 It seems doubtful, however, whether a riparian owner may acquire a prescriptive right to pollute a stream since such use in its inception probably constitutes a "public nuisance." B1 "Dunlap v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 212 N.C. 814, 195 S.E. 43 (1938). «Aycock, note 3, p. 565, pp. 3-15. See, e.g., Walton v. Mills, 86 N.C. 280 (1882) ; Harris v. Norfolk A Wastern Ry., 153 N.C. 542, 69 S.E. 623 (1910). «Smith v. Town of Morganton, supra note 39, Ooolc v. Town of Mebane, 191 N.C. 1, 131 S.E. 2d 449 (1941) ; Pernell v. City of Henderson, 220 N.C. 79, 16 S.E. 2d 449 (1941). ** Kitchen Lumber Oo. v. Tallassee Power Co., 212 N.C. 814, 195 S.E. 43 (1938) ; of. Sink v. City of Lexington, 214 N.C. 548, 200 S.E. 4 (1938). «Phillips v. Hasset Mining Co., 244 N.C. 17, 92 S.E. 2d 429 (1956). "Town of Smithfleld v. City of Raleigh, 207 N.C. 597, 178 S.E. 114 (1935). "Durham v. Cotton Mills, 141 N.C. 615, 54 S.E. 453 (1906) ; Phillips v. Hasset Mining Co., note 45, supra. «Sec. 143-215.16 (b). *» This is the Inference In Young v. City of Asheville, 241 N.C. 618, 86 S.B. 2d 449 (1941), 408 (1955). ™Darr v. Carolina Aluminum Co., 215 N.C. 768, 3 S.E. 2d 434 (1939). f*Town of Selby v. Cleveland Mill & Power Co., 155 N.C. 196, 71 S.E. 218 (1911) ; Cf. North Carolina Bd. of Health v. Comm'rs., 173 N.C. 250, 254, 91 S.E. 1019, 1022 (1917). |