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Show 114 ARIZONA Upon reaching a stream or wash with a well-defined channel, these surface waters lose their identity as diffused surface water and become waters of the watercourse.78 In Arizona, floodwater is distinguished from surface water by the fact that it is water which has broken away or escaped from the watercourse and spread over the adjoining land in no regular channel.79 When floodwaters escape the watercourse and flow over the adjoining land, the landowner may divert such waters from his land as a common enemy.80 The property of a lower landowner is burdened with an easement in favor of the upper landowner to receive those surface waters which naturally drain from the higher ground to the lower ground.81 But the upper landowner cannot collect surface water in artificial channels and discharge it in large quantities upon the lower landowner.82 4. Grotjnd Water For purposes of determining rights to ground water, the Arizona Supreme Court has classified ground water into two broad cate- gories: (1) ground water in definite and well-defined underground channels, and (2) ground water percolating through the soil. All ground water is presumed to be percolating.83 Waters in definite underground channels have always been con- sidered to be subject to appropriation, the same as surface waters of a watercourse. This concept was incorporated into Arizona's water code.84 However, percolating ground water is not public water subject to the appropriation doctrine, and is considered to be the property of the owner of the soil.85 But this ownership is not without qualification. Arizona has adopted the rule of reasonable use-that is, the owner of the property must use the ground water supply underlying his land in a manner which is reasonable in relation to the rights of all other property owners to use water from the same ground water supply.86 The Arizona Supreme Court has had occasion to review this doctrine in a very recent decision. An action was filed by the land- owners in a critical ground water basin to prevent the city of Tucson from transporting water outside the basin for its municipal use. In its initial decision, the supreme court enjoined the proposed use by the city, concluding that the water had to be used on the land from which it was pumped. However, the matter was again presented to the court, and the court modified its previous decision, concluding that if the city acquired title to land within the basin from which it sought to export the water, then the city would be entitled to withdraw an amount of water for municipal use-for use w City of Glooe v. Shute. 22 Ariz. 282, 196 Pac. 1024 (1921). » Kennecott Copper Corp. v. McDowell, 100 Ariz. 276, 413 P. 2d 747 (1966) ; Kirkpatrick V. Butler, 14 Ariz. App. 377, 483 P. 2d 790 (1971). so Gillespie hand and Irrigation Co. v. Gonzalez, 93 Ariz. 152, 379 P. 2d 135 (1963). 81 Vantex Land and Development Go. v. Schnepf, 82 Ariz. 54, 308 P. 2d 254 (1957). 82 Maricopa County Municipal Water Conservancy Dist. No. 1 v. Warford, 69 Ariz. 1, 206 P. 2d 1168 (1949). 83 Howard V. Perrin, 8 Ariz. 347, 76 Pac. 460 (1904) ; Maricopa County Municipal Water Conservancy Dist. No. 1 v. Southwest Cotton Go.. 39 Ariz. 65, 4 P. 2d 369 (1931). <" Ariz. Rev. Stat. sec. 45-101. 85 Howard v. Perrin, 8 Ariz. 347, 76 Pac. 460 (1904) ; State v. Anway, 87 Ariz. 208, 349 P. 2d774 (1960). ««Bristor V. Cheatham, 75 Ariz. 227, 255 P. 2d 173 (1953). |