OCR Text |
Show nations, the office reached the couclusion that the general rule which prohibited Indian tribes and individual citizens thereof from cutting timber and taking out minerals for sale would not apply to the Choctaw and Chickasaw nations, in view of t,he fee-simple title by which they hold their lands. Consequently it would have been possibleprior to the agreement of April 23, 1897, for the Chickaeaw Nation, with the concurrence of the Choctaw Nation, to have granted its citizens a license under which they woulld have been permitted to mine coal or any other mineral for the purpose of sale without a violation of the statutes of the United States; but the Chickasaw Zation alone could not have that power, inasmuch as the treaties between the United States and the Choctaw and Chickasaw nations declared that the lands shonld be held by the nations in common in the proportion of three-fourths to the Choctaw Nation and one-fourt,h to the Chickasaw Nation, and that no cesfiiou or agreement affecting said lands should be effective without the concurrence of the two nations. The office also held to the opinion that neither the Choctaw nor the Chickasaw nations separately, nor both jointly, could grant by a stat. ute to a corporation of its citizens the power to lease any part of the public domain of either nation for the purpose of mining or for any other' purpose without violating section 2116 of the Revised Statutes, the Attorney-General having held in an opinion dated Jnly 21,1885, that said section 2116, being so general and comprehensive, wasnot lim-ited in its operation by the nature or extent of the title to the land which the tribe or nation may hold, and that whether snch title be a feeaimple or a right of occupancy only was not material. In either case the statute applies. The conclusion was reached, therefore, that the charter of the Davis Mining Company, which authorized the company to take ont and sell minerals in the Choctaw and Chickasaw nations, and which had not been concurred in by the Choctaw Xation was void, and that conse-quently the corporation has no legal existence; that the lease from the said company was not only void on account of the fact that the com-pany itself did not exist, but was void for the further reason that it was not anthorized by the law of the Chickasaw Nation; and if said law could be construed as giving snch aothority, thelaw was invalid, because the lease was in violation of section 2116 of the Revised Stat-utes; also that the sublease by the lessee of the Davis Mining Company was likewise void for the same reason. As to the fourhh question, the of6ce was of the opinion that no per-son or corporation, although having a lease, would be entitled to claim the right to lease by law under the agreement, unless such person or corporation had been in actual possession of the mine sought to be leased and had developed the same in good faith prior to April 23,1897, and was at that date in possession thereof. This, however, is not to be understood as holding that theremight not be some circumstances and |