||18 EDWIN B. FIRMAGE Commander-in-Chief the president was intended simply to be Congress' general. No power not given by any other text was conveyed by the statement on executive power. The "take care" clause simply obligated the president to execute congressional laws. The latter has been asserted to be an executive "necessary and proper" clause by ironic, if not cynical, bootstrapping. Under these provisions Congress not only possesses sole power to decide for war, establish and govern our military forces and determine rules for their governance and use; and establish our commercial relations with other states; but also Congress with the president should establish and direct the strategy of our foreign relations. As Professor Louis Henkin observed, the treaty power invested in the president and the Senate gives the tip-off to the Framers' intent.32 Since foreign relations were conducted primarily by treaty in the eighteenth century, the bestowal upon the Senate and the presidency of the treaty power reveals the determination that our foreign relations should be governed collegially. E. The Current Crisis Most of the facts in the Iran-Nicaragua crisis are now known. Substantial modern armaments were secretly sold to Iran by order of the president in barter for hostages. By presidential order this information was kept from Congress and the American people.33 Part of the money gained by this sale of weaponry was diverted to the Nicara-guan Contras.34 This activity was carried out by the CIA under the direction of certain members of the National Security Council, an advisory body turned operational by this administration in order to avoid statutory restrictions of Congress upon other agencies of government.35 32 L. Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1972). 33 On January 17, 1986, President Reagan signed a secret intelligence "finding" waiving previous regulations prohibiting arms shipments to Iran and authorizing direct United States arms transactions with Iran. This January 17 finding also states that "due to its extreme sensitivity and security risks" prior notice should be limited and directs the Director of Central Intelligence to refrain from reporting this Finding to the Congress as provided in Section 501 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, until [the President] otherwise directs." 34 N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1986, A-l, cols. 3-4; Report of the President's Special Review Board, 111-19, 120 (Feb. 26, 1987). 35 The Intelligence Authorization Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 96-4350, 94 Stat. 1975 (1980) (adding "Title V - Accountability for Intelligence Activities" to the National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. §§ 401-405 (1980)).