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Title Ends and means in conflict
Subject Nuclear warfare--Moral and ethical aspects; War--Moral and ethical aspects; War--Religious aspects; War and emergency powers--United States; Ends and means
Description The 49th Annual Frederick William Reynolds Lecture.
Creator Firmage, Edwin Brown
Publisher Division of Continuing Education, University of Utah
Date 1987-10-15
Date Digital 2008-05-29
Type Text
Format application/pdf
Digitization Specifications Original scanned on Epson Expression 10000XL flatbed scanner and saved as 400 ppi uncompressed tiff. Display images generated in PhotoshopCS and uploaded into CONTENTdm Aquisition Station.
Resource Identifier,1147
Source U263 .F57 1987
Language eng
Relation Digital reproduction of "Ends and means in conflict," J. Willard Marriott Library Special Collections
Rights Digital Image Copyright University of Utah
Metadata Cataloger Seungkeol Choe; Ken Rockwell
ARK ark:/87278/s6x34vfm
Setname uu_fwrl
Date Created 2008-07-29
Date Modified 2008-07-31
ID 320434
Reference URL

Page Metadata

Title Page 12
Description 12 EDWIN B. FIRM AGE The more I reflected on the experiences of history, the more I have come to see the instability of solutions achieved by force and to suspect even those instances where force has had the appearance of resolving difficulties. Sir Basil Liddell Hart18 The Framers of our Constitution separated the power to decide for war from the power to conduct it. The power to initiate war, except for sudden attack upon our country, was lodged exclusively in the Congress. The president was confined to conducting war once Congress had decided upon such a course. The assumptions behind this separation of war power are as vital to us 200 years later as they were when these ideas were penned in Philadelphia. The executive or monarchical inclination to make war impulsively, without deliberate debate among a sizeable and varied body of people, was thought by many to have contributed to decades of war that ravaged Europe. War came almost to be the natural condition, interrupted rarely by periods of peace. The Framers thought that by denying to the president the monarchical power of raising armies and deciding for war, and placing such powers in the Congress, the sensitivities of the people who had to fight such wars and pay for them would be reflected through their representatives. In other words, the condition of peace, not war, was considered to be normal. The biases and presumptions of law and government, the inertia factor, were placed on the side of peace. Those who were for war had the burden of persuasion not easily borne. Only after open debate in a deliberative body, a process intentionally meant to prevent precipitous, cavalier action, would the state move from peace to war. A number of factors have eroded these constitutional checks against war. Two world wars and a depression in this century have moved much power in government from the deliberative body-Congress-to the executive. Certain advantages of administration and dispatch are obvious. But the costs of executive abuse-Watergate, Iran and Nicaragua, and executive war in Korea and Vietnam-have been devastating. Perhaps government based upon an assumption of perpetual crisis fulfills its own presumption. 18 Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Why Don't We Learn From History? 72 (New York: Hawthorne Books, 1971).
Format application/pdf
Identifier 015-RNLT- firmageE_ Page 12.jpg
Source Original Manuscript: Ends and means in conflict by Edwin B. Firmage.
Setname uu_fwrl
Date Created 2008-07-29
Date Modified 2008-07-29
ID 320396
Reference URL