||ENDS AND MEANS IN CONFLICT 15 sional ratification of presidential acts and by presidential abuse and congressional malfeasance on occasion, clearly reveals the norm of congressional control and presidential dependence in the decision for war and peace. This is so through the Indian wars, the Whiskey Rebellion, the Barbary pirates to the Civil War; and from our endemic preoccupation with intervention in the Caribbean to border crossings into Mexico and Canada. Our pattern continued through two world wars until Korea and Vietnam. James Madison noted that "[T]he executive is the department of power most distinguished by its propensity to war: hence it is the practice of all states, in proportion as they are free, to disarm this propensity of its influence."21 Hamilton, the advocate of presidential power in the Philadelphia Convention, nevertheless recognized that the president's power "would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military forces," since the president lacked the British Crown's authority to declare war and raise armies.22 The power given Congress rests upon the constitutional text that Congress be empowered to "declare war and grant letters of marque and reprisal." This entails the power to decide for war declared or undeclared, whether fought with regular public forces or by privateers under governmental mandate. While letters of marque and reprisal originally covered specific acts, by the eighteenth century letters of marque and reprisal referred to sovereign use of private and sometimes public forces to injure another state. It was within this context that the constitutional Framers vested Congress with the power to issue letters of marque and reprisal.23 Clearly, only Congress has the However, James Madison and Elbridge Gerry were not satisfied with the proposal of the Committee on Detail that the legislature be given the power to make war. Instead, they moved to substitute "declare" for "make," "leaving to the Executive the power to repel sudden attacks." The meaning of this motion, which eventually was carried by a vote of seven states to two, was clear. The power to initiate war was left to Congress, with the reservation from Congress to the president to repel a sudden attack on the United States. See 2 M. Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 313, 318 (rev. ed. 1937); see F. Wormuth & E. Firmage, supra note 16, at 17-18. 21 As quoted in F. Wormuth & E. Firmage, supra note 16, at 179. 22 Id. 23 Lobel, Covert War and Congressional Authority: Hidden War and Forgotten Power, 134 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1035 (1986).