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Show commencement and their rate of progress. This has led, particularly in recent years, to an over- emphasis upon the prospects of stabilizing our whole economy through the bold use of public expenditures for these purposes. There are valid reasons why variation of such expenditures, in accordance with this compensa- tory theory, cannot accomplish as much toward stabilization as some have supposed. In the event of severe unemployment, these expendi- tures cannot be generated in sufficient volume to avoid supplementation by other means. In a period of mild recession, they cannot be gen- erated in time to be fully effective. Furthermore, they would then tend to extend their period of construction beyond the point where they are needed and might become inflationary rather than stabilizing. Even if advance preparations are made through the completion of plans, the acquisition of sites, and the accumulation of funds, there will be an inevitable time lag between calling the emergency program into operation and the employment of men on the job. These comments are substantiated by experi- ence. The chief lesson to be learned is that no one device constitutes an adequate safeguard against recession or an adequate fighting appara- tus against depression. All useful devices need to be thought through in advance and blended into a consistent program. Instead of regarding these public expenditures as the first and foremost device to restore our whole economy when it sags, we should attempt to stabilize resources development programs ac- cording to our long-term needs. Increasing regulariza.tion of public expenditures at all levels of governmental activity over a long period will offer an assurance of a demand for capital, of a market for materials and equipment, and of a field for employment which will assist in stabiliz- ing that segment of the business world. This approach to public expenditures will have the further advantage of permitting appraisal of their size and character in terms of our total national needs. Background of Proposed Procedures The background for the proposed investment program procedure is found in Executive Order 9384, dated October 4,1943, by which President Roosevelt ordered the Federal agencies to pre- pare and annually revise long-range programs for public works and improvement projects. These advance programs, covering 6 years, are submitted to the Bureau of the Budget. The Bureau prepares, on the basis of these estimates, a consolidated 6-year program for the Execu- tive Branch, with indications of the additional amounts needed for completion. The Executive Order also instructed all agen- cies to submit their reports and plans regarding such programs to the Bureau for advice as to their relation to the President's program, before submitting them to Congress. They must in- clude the Bureau's advice in their presentation to Congress. The Bureau is authorized to obtain the information it needs from the various agencies in relation to advance programs, the status of projects, or the status of planning. Under t^present system, each Federal agency draws ifp its own program, consulting its regional representatives and attempting to coordinate its programs with those of other agencies responsible for related functions. When the programs are transmitted to the Bureau of the Budget, there is a further effort at coordination and integration among the several programs. The several pro- grams are then fitted into a national program of expenditures for the Government as a whole. The procedure has several serious inadequacies, which the Commission believes can be remedied in large part by adoption of its recommendations for planning and programming. First, the coordinated plans are not developed by regional organizations on a comprehensive regional basis. Second, real integration of the plans of different agencies is impossible where in- tegration takes place after the programs are formulated. Real integration in multiple-pur- pose planning can result only from placing the 88 |
