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Show Hinckley Journal of Politics Autumn 1998 The threat of such retaliation, made clear to Teheran, will play a far stronger role in deterring its support of terrorism than economic sanctions that neither prevent Iran from trading nor affect its ability to support such activities. This carrot-and-stick approach toward Iran will preserve containment and thus protect U.S. interests in the Gulf. At the same time, it will allow for a reduction in tensions between the United States and Iran, as well as in rifts between the United States and its allies over trade sanctions. In contrast to a policy of dual containment, therefore, the United States should attempt to pursue a policy of dual engagement-active moves for change in Iraq that will form a basis for future relations, and a rapprochement with Iran that will maintain containment while establishing a dialogue-in the Persian Gulf. A strategy must be adopted in order for such a policy to succeed. Its goal must be to maintain stability in the region. The cooperation of U.S. allies is vital, and consultation over policy will be necessary. This strategy would prevent either Iraq or Iran, the two largest powers in the Gulf, from attaining a preponderance of power relative to their neighbors. Through a multilateral approach, the United States and its allies, both within the region and outside of it, would work to prevent either nation from upsetting the military balance between them. This would include, of course, weapons of mass destruction. The sale of reactors capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium, for example, would be circumscribed, and technologies that could result in the production of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons by either country (including some dual-use technologies) would also be prohibited. There are precedents for such efforts, including the Wassenaar Arrangement, already in place. Countries such as Russia and China could be offered incentives (participation in the World Trade Organization, for example) to prevent the supply of such technology to Iraq and Iran. Furthermore, a post-Saddam Iraq and an Iran that enjoys diplomatic and economic relations with the West would be more receptive to such a policy, which would also aim to reduce tensions between the two (discussions over the status of the Shatt al-Arab Waterway, for example). Any attempt to procure destabilizing conventional weaponry (nuclear-powered attack submarines, for example) would be blocked. A military presence also must be maintained in the Persian Gulf, to directly block any threat to its security. The existing U.S. force structure, relying on an over-the-horizon presence and rapid deployment, is well-suited. Deployment of naval and air forces by the NATO allies, as well as cooperation from the GCC states, will make this effort multilateral, and will strengthen overall cooperation in conducting this policy. Within the GCC countries, there has been unrest, due in part to the feelings of disenfranchisement among certain segments of society. Shi'a in Bahrain, for example, feel marginalized by the ruling elite, and many in Saudi Arabia feel that the country's rulers are corrupt and ineffective. Moreover, the significant U.S. presence in these countries gives such individuals a convenient target at which to strike. The United States, with its allies, must encourage some form of liberalization in these countries. This cannot be sweeping or rapid: as the example of the Shah in the late 1970s shows, liberalization under pressure from abroad will lead to instability and the collapse of the existing regime. However, if the governments of the GCC states do not attempt to strengthen their legitimacy by initiating some reforms (for example, elections with moderate opposition forces, easing of press restrictions), this opposition could explode into revolution, having dire consequences both for the leaders of these countries and for the world as a whole. Efforts by the United States and its allies, including a clear position of support for the existing leadership of the GCC states, is necessary for reform to come about. One other area of concern in the Middle East remains to be addressed as part of a new U.S. strategy for the Gulf. The peace process between Israel and the Palestinians, which is in jeopardy at the time of this writing, must continue. The success of this effort will help strengthen the position of the United States in the region, showing that its initiatives will bring peace, prosperity and security to the Middle East, thus isolating such revisionist forces as militant Islamists who hope to weaken the U.S. position in the region. Dual containment has been unable to accomplish its goals effectively, being seen as separate from, rather than a complement to, the peace process (which it was meant to support). A new U.S. strategy must take the peace process into account, treating it as an integral element in maintaining stability in the Persian Gulf, where revisionist forces have emerged. A policy of dual engagement, rather than dual containment, is needed in the Persian Gulf, and it must be the cornerstone of U.S. policy in the Middle East. Maintaining access to the oil reserves of the Persian Gulf is necessitated by their role in the global economy. In presenting it to the public, U.S. officials and policymakers must emphasize its importance for American policy in the Middle East as a whole and, indeed, for global stability. Vigorous efforts must be made to bring U.S. allies into agreement with such a policy, and their engagement is necessary for its success. A broad, multilateral approach, under dynamic U.S. leadership, is key to protecting American interests in this volatile part of the world. The sooner the United States realizes this and acts accordingly, the better it will be for security and stability across the globe. References Amuzegar, Jahangir. 1997. "Adjusting to Sanctions," Foreign Affairs, May/June, 31-41. Baker, James A. III. 1996. Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, September 12. Binnendijk, Hans A., et al. 1996. Strategic Assessment J996: Instruments of U.S. Power. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press. Brzezinski, Zbigniew, Richard Murphy and Brent Scowcroft. 1997. "Differentiated Containment," Foreign Affairs, May/June, 20-30. Byman, Daniel. 1996. "Let Iraq Collapse," National Interest, Fall, 48-60. 87 |
