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Show Dual Containment: Successes, Failures, and Prospects for Changes in Policy David Walsh icy toward Iran (e.g. the Iran-Contra scandal)-have led to sanctions causing much less damage to Iran's economy-and the stability of the regime-than the United States hoped would be the case. An oil embargo, one supported by U.N. Security Council resolutions, would cause Iran serious economic difficulties, but Amuzegar believes that such a step would be unlikely, due to Security Council members' opposi-tion, including that of permanent members with veto power such as France, Russia and China. Also, "an embargo against Iranian oil would likely push crude prices through the roof for a while, another reason all oil-importing nations would resist it" (38). U.S. policymakers also have voiced concern regarding some elements of containment toward Iran. Robert H. Pelletreau, testifying to the International Relations Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, stated that "We (the United States) are dissatisfied with some performance by our allies toward Iran and Libya" (1996), referring to such actions as the maintenance of trade relations and a lack of political condemnation of these states for support of terrorism. F. Gregory Gause III, an authority on Middle Eastern studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, sees serious flaws in dual containment as well: It is hard to see how either Iraq or Iran could be contained, in the administration's sense [by U.S. power and that of allies], without the cooperation of its hostile counterpart. American allies in the region and elsewhere have shown no enthusiasm for dual containment, making its implementation highly problematic. Dual containment offers no guidelines for dealing with change in the gulf, and it ties American policy to an inherently unstable regional status quo. Worse yet, it assigns to the United States a unilateral role in managing gulf security issues at a time when the American capacity to influence events in Iran and Iraq is at best limited. The policy could end up encouraging the very results-regional conflict and increased Iranian power-that the United States seeks to prevent (1994, 56-57). While opposition to dual containment among U.S. policymakers and experts has grown, perhaps the most serious criticism has come from abroad, particularly in Europe. Shortly after the United States launched cruise missile strikes against Iraq in retaliation for its intervention in the Kurdish region, this letter appeared in a German newspaper: Washington's deficient political strategy toward Iraq has caused deep frustration and bitterness in the Arab world. The international sanctions and the postponement of the limited Iraqi oil shipments only torment the innocent public, the general view holds, while doing nothing against the dictator. In Arab eyes, all this has destabilized the region and opened the door for non-Arab powers-Turkey and Iran-to exercise influence dangerously in northern Iraq. For that reason, Washington's friends are urging the Americans to reconsider their policy toward Saddam. This seems all the more pressing to them because President Clinton's support for Israel's Prime Minister Netanyahu, who is clearly not ready for peace, is increasingly embittering the Arab masses. The old reproach about a "double standard" echoes loudly (The Week in Germany 1996, 3). Now that we have looked at the U.S. dual containment policy, and presented a rather strong critique of it from a European, we examine the policies of America's allies toward Iraq and Iran, in order to provide a fuller perspective on the U.S. approach toward these countries. Policies of U.S. Allies The policies followed by the United States' allies, most notably those in Europe, differ in many ways from the policies of the United States. Most of these countries support and maintain sanctions on Iraq, in accordance with the United Nations resolutions, and also provide military support for enforcing the no-fly zones in that country. Yet, they have raised questions about the effectiveness of the U.S. policy toward Baghdad. They have a different view of Iran. While recognizing that Iran does present some threat to the Persian Gulf, the allies believe that Washington must change its approach to Teheran, with diplomatic and economic engagement seen as necessary to help maintain security in the region. The approach of the NATO allies in the Gulf has been mixed. Britain has been a staunch supporter of U.S. policy, perhaps reflecting the "special relationship" that the two countries have enjoyed historically. Germany, while not as outspoken in its support as Britain, has been supportive of American policy. France, however, has been critical of U.S. actions, often refusing to follow Washington's lead. Although the French have toned down their critiques, in order to maintain good relations with the United States, they have sent unmistakable signals of displeasure regarding American behavior. In September 1996, when the United States extended the southern no-fly zone north from the 32nd to the 33rd Parallel, France announced that its aircraft would only patrol up to the 32nd, and not in the area the zone had been extended to cover by the United States (Grier 1996, 8). With recent overtures by the United Nations toward Iraq regarding the sale of oil for food and medical supplies, the possibility that U.N. sanctions may be lifted has arisen. The French hope that, if sanctions are partially or wholly lifted, they will be able to secure investments and trade-most notably in oil-with Iraq. With $4 billion owed by Iraq to France, the incentives for moving beyond a confrontational approach toward Baghdad to one of at least limited cooperation have appeared to be attractive in Paris. The relationship between the allies and Iran is also different from that pursued by the United States. While Washington seeks to contain Iran and isolate it from other states, the Europeans see opportunities for investment and better relations with Teheran. They are upset by U.S. sanctions imposed on countries with diplomatic or economic links to Iran, which they see as damaging. The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 led to a complaint being filed by the European Union with the World Trade Organization, together with an implied threat of retaliation if the United States attempts to enforce the Act, as it is "secondary boycott" 84 |