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Show Hinckley Journal of Politics Autumn 1998 ered. Finally, the actual tasks to be implemented would be relatively simple and straightforward. Hence, the more complex an issue, the more likely that bureaucratic discretion will need to be involved. For maximum accountability in this cell, much depends on the degree of involvement on the part of the higher political authorities. Such involvement would mean being able to control what individuals further down the implementation process chain are doing. If this can be done adequately, then the case against the bureaucratic exercise of discretion is generally stronger. While such an argument appears feasible on paper, in reality it would be much more difficult to realize all of the conditions necessary to fall in the category of Cell I. This is because it would be extremely difficult to meet all of the necessary conditions. Even Burke readily admits that "few cases of policy implementation probably fall within this cell" (138). Cell II: Use of Professional Expertise In Cell II the rules for exercising discretion are determined at an internal level. This is typically the case where a bureaucratic agency requires a high level of expertise from its professionals. While in such fields it is not uncommon that the professionals in the policy process are given substantial amounts of discretion, at the same time they are held strongly accountable for their actions. Accountability conceivably could come in such forms as memberships and licenses to practice in fields and organizations. Such accountability can be found at the level or community that already governs the professional's actions. Accountability also can take place in the form of political oversight in the policy process. Burke suggests that this cell often will find significant amounts of accountability and because of this any discretion used is perfectly acceptable. To this he says that "when professionals and other technical experts have been granted license to act on the basis of their own skills and judgment, deference to discretionary actions that may result is obviously in order" (141). At the same time, it must be realized that there are limits to professional expertise. Just because something might make sense in a particular profession does not necessarily mean that it is good public policy, nor should it be left up to professional discretion. An example currently making headlines deals with the issue of cloning. While it could be scientifically possible to clone humans, this does not mean necessarily that it should be done. Another current example is found in doctor-assisted suicides. Most would agree that this is not an issue that should be left to the sole discretion of the professional. For the most part, accountability in Cell II is high. This is because the "experts" usually can give a good account of their discretionary actions. However, it must be realized that it is also possible for the professional community's own interests to predominate at the expense of the public's interest. Burke points out that it is quite possible for professionals to take a self-serving attitude by enhancing their own "turf." This can be done through the development of exclusionary communications networks, biased agendas and rigid standards for what the problems are and how they will be solved. Burke sees this as potentially being hostile to innovation or external control. If such cases arise, "deference to professional expertise must be tempered by a recognition of the contestable and often problematic character of professional judgement and practice" (41). Cell III: "Fragmented Implementation" In Cell III, external authorities attempt to exercise control and direction in the implementation process, but more often than not fail to do so. In contrast to Cell I, the conditions necessary for strong control are not found. These conditions include greater distance from policy formation to policy implementation than in Cell I. In this cell the bureaucracy that will implement the policy is often complex, while the policy tasks which they have been asked to implement are often difficult to achieve. This is even more problematic when the particular agency is lukewarm to a new idea or does not see a need for a change in direction. What policy implementors actually do in situations found in Cell III is something that Burke feels requires much more thought and research. "Of all the situations in each of the four cells where discretion might be exercised, the normative justification for exercising discretion under the circumstances of Cell III has not been adequately examined" (142). Burke contends that the conditions found in Cell III are unsuitable for effective policy implementation. To remedy such situations, Burke suggests that the policy implementors might return to the policy makers for more direction, moving in the direction of Cell I, or develop their own expertise and move in the direction of Cell II. If any discretion is to be used in Cell III conditions, it should be incremental and pragmatic. This moving forward should be based on experience and tangible results. Finally, any exercise of discretion that would result in long-range commitments should be avoided, so as to not make future choices or corrections more difficult. Cell IV: "Personal, Political and Moral Views" In the final cell, the exercise of discretion is for the most part based solely on the official's own personal judgement. Here there are no formal guidelines as found in Cells I and III, yet there is no expert or professional judgement as found in Cell II. Needless to say, this cell poses potential dangers. While not completely realistic, many examples of this can be found in the movies with the small town sheriffs who can assume the role of lawmaker, judge, and executioner. Regardless of whether such situations exist, these could easily fall under the parameter of Cell IV. To such situations Burke asserts that "elevating personal beliefs to the level of bureaucratic practice compromises the logic and purposes of democracy" (143). 31 |
