OCR Text |
Show Bureaucratic Accountability: A Look at Utah's Redevelopment Agencies Adam Caldwell Other potential dangers that can be found in Cell IV can be seen as an assault on democratic government. Such assaults could come upon the principles of consent, majority rule, and minority rights. This could be done solely on the basis of the implementor's personal beliefs and occur without proper justification. Under such circumstances the "smell" test could be applied. If officials cannot provide adequate justifications for their actions other than "cuz," then they most likely "fail to meet the basic test of having an adequate sense of what their responsibilities are and being accountable, either to themselves or others, for their actions" (144). It also must be realized that not every town across America will have exactly the same ideals. For example, the nonenforcement of laws against prostitution in a large city might be acceptable whereas nonenforcement in a small town might not be acceptable. In such situations, the political and moral beliefs of that particular community demand consideration. The same small town sheriff who personally found prostitution to be acceptable in a town that felt otherwise would not last long if he chose not to enforce such ordinances. Expectations from the Typological Approach As one might expect, quite probably actual cases will not fall neatly into an individual cell. Crossovers are a given. Certain characteristics can be established to put real situations more into one category than another. Burke suggests that this typology should be used to enhance our general theoretical understanding of bureaucratic discretion, so that those particular instances can be better understood and evaluated. While something may be lost in the process of simplification, there is also something to be gained in the area of theoretical clarity. Utah's Redevelopment Agencies Utah Redevelopment Agencies' Place in Birke's Typology Put simply, Utah's redevelopment agencies fall under the category of Cell III. First considered here is why the agencies do not fit into the other three. Few agencies fall under Cell I to begin with and Utah's RDAs are not among them. The only political body that can make laws for Utah's redevelopment agencies is the Utah State Legislature. Because the part-time legislature meets for only 45 days each year, it is difficult, if not impossible, for any micro-managing to occur. A second problem occurs in the area of complexity of the organization. Utah has more than 50 redevelopment agencies. These agencies range from those doing millions of dollars a year in business to agencies that do maybe one project every other year. While one attempt at further control may be seen as a mere speed bump for a larger redevelopment agency, the same policy could severely cripple another. A final problem that stands in the way of Cell I accountability is the complexity of the issue that is to be implemented. Redevelopment in a city is not a simple matter. When a redevelopment project is formed, the agency must weigh the interests of the private landowners, the developers, and the taxpayers, as well as general interests of the city as expressed by a legislative majority. Burke, referring to three conditions for Cell I accountability, notes that "in many instances one or more of these conditions will not be met" (138). In this particular instance, none of the three conditions are met. Cell II is not an exact description of the redevelopment agencies either. Rarely, if ever, do directors of redevelopment agencies try to regulate other redevelopment agencies to prevent them from giving such agencies in general a bad name. There is little collaboration among redevelopment agencies in the state, or in other states. Finally, while there has been plenty of attempted legislation regarding redevelopment agencies at the Legislature, none of it in recent memory has been initiated by the redevelopment agencies themselves. Cell IV is not a clear fit either. This cell could be adequately described as a condition in which one will "fly by the seat of one's pants." This is not the case in redevelopment. While much discretion is to be exercised, there are clear rules and procedures that must be followed in a certain order. An example of where clear rules and procedures must be followed is in the planning and adoption of a redevelopment project. Six major steps must be followed in precise order. The first step includes a blight survey area that is identified for study. After the study, the RDA board holds a hearing to determine whether parts or all of the area qualify as blighted. The plan or project area is then put together. This is followed by the community's planning commission reviewing the project to ensure that it conforms to its master plan. The redevelopment board then holds a series of public hearings for comments and suggestions on the proposed plan and budget. Finally, any affected taxing agencies must then approve the project so that tax increment financing may be used. In Cell IV, a redevelopment agency conceivably could get away with skipping one or more of these steps in developing a project area. Such an example could be skipping the initial blight study. Even in situations where the town fool can clearly see the blight, the study must be done regardless. Finally, it is the opinion of redevelopment agencies' directors and politicians that there is no perceivably consistent political belief found among redevelopment agencies. In a March 3, 1998 interview by the author, Richard Turpin, Deputy Director of Salt Lake's redevelopment agency, pointed out that Democrats and Republicans split on this issue each year without regard to party preferences. An agency does not operate differently depending on the director's political preference. This leads to the discussion of why redevelopment agencies in Utah fall under the scope of Cell III. As mentioned before, there is the issue of the part-time legislature. As Burke points out, in such situations, "the distance between policy formulation and implementation is great" (Burke 1990, 142). While the implementation is being done by the agencies, the principals who are supposed to oversee their agents are back on the farm, running their businesses or getting back to enjoy- 32 |