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Show Dual Containment: Successes, Failures, and Prospects for Changes in Policy David Walsh States is viewed as an unwelcome presence, having secured for itself the position Iran covets as its own (Sciolino 1997, A4). The recent buildup by Iran of its armed forces has been worrisome to the United States. In July 1989, President Hashemi Rafsanjani signed an agreement with the Soviet Union for the supply of some $1.9 billion in arms. This included 48 MiG-29 fighters and 100 T-72 tanks. In January 1990, his government undertook a five-year military plan, which allocated $2 billion per year for the next five years to purchase advanced weapons. Teheran's long-term objective is to build a military consisting of an air force of 300 or so modern combat aircraft, mostly MiG-29s and -31s and SU-24s; an army of 5,000-6,000 tanks, 2,000 self-propelled artillery pieces and several thousand armored personnel carriers; and a navy equipped with three sophisticated Russian-made Kilo-class submarines and a number of missile armed fast patrol boats (Phillips 1994, 7). With Iranian support of terrorist groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, its military buildup, its hegemonic ambitions in the Gulf, and its adversarial policies toward the United States, Iran is a serious threat to U.S. interests in the region. Earlier U.S. policy, like that followed during the Iran-Iraq War, sought to maintain a balance between Iraq and Iran in the Gulf, so as to prevent either from moving against their Gulf neighbors. Dual containment took a different approach, seeking to keep both countries weak while relying on allies to support containment efforts. Anthony Lake, National Security Advisor to President Clinton from 1993 to 1997, wrote in 1994: "The Clinton Administration's strategy toward these two backlash states begins from the premise that today both regimes pursue policies hostile to our interests__ Rather, we seek with our regional allies to maintain a favorable balance without depending on either Iraq or Iran" (1994, 48). Given the current situation and the hostility of Iraq and Iran toward the United States, supporters of dual containment argue that the United States should continue the policy. In 1992, calls for dual containment were made in Washington, supported by arguments that containment was needed to prevent Iraq or Iran from gaining control over the vital oil supplies of the Gulf (Phillips 1992, 1). As long as the present regimes remain in power in Baghdad and Teheran, and as long as they threaten the Gulf, the supporters of dual containment believe that this policy is the only way to deal with this threat. The Case against Dual Containment Many U.S. policy analysts assert that dual containment has harmed rather than enhanced American security in the Persian Gulf. In their view, dual containment is not suitable in terms of what the United States should be doing in the Gulf, and has harmed relations between the United States and its allies. These individuals call for changes in U.S. policy regarding Iraq and Iran. In their article "Differentiated Containment" in the May/June 1997 issue of Foreign Affairs, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Brent Scowcroft, and Richard Murphy question the basic structure of dual containment. Dual containment, in their view, is "more a slogan than a strategy" (20), and has caused the United States a host of difficulties. The fact that Saddam Hussein is still in power so many years after his defeat in the Gulf War, coupled with the growing lack of enthusiasm among U.S. allies for continued containment of Baghdad, calls for a new approach toward Iraq. Containment of Iran, the authors argue, has led to divisions between the United States and its Group of Seven partners, while leading Teheran to cultivate a stronger relationship with Moscow, including massive arms purchases that increase Iran's military threat to the Persian Gulf. The authors cite another problem with dual containment: It ignores the internal instability of many GCC states in which U.S. forces are deployed, and the fact that the deployment of these forces helps to increase Islamic fundamentalist fervor in these countries. They also argue for a fresh approach by the United States toward its Persian Gulf policy. A multilateral effort must be made regarding Iraq, including an easing of the sanctions to purchase food and medical supplies in exchange for oil; a willingness to maintain the integrity of the Iraqi state, rather than to create a separate Kurdish state in the north and/or Shiite state in the south; closer cooperation with Turkey, whose participation is vital to American policy, most notably protection of the Kurds in northern Iraq; a willingness, stated clearly, to work with a "post-Saddam" government in Baghdad; and strong action when United Nations resolutions are violated (25-26). Iran, these authors argue, is more complex in terms of its relations with the United States and its position in the Gulf than Iraq. They point out that the United States will remain capable of confronting any military threat from Iran well into the foreseeable future. Furthermore, the instability within Iran makes the maintenance of domestic consensus the prime mission of the government, precluding leadership of a unified bloc of nations bent on spreading radical Islam, akin to the threat of Communism during the Cold War. Such a "green threat" has been postulated by supporters of dual containment in discussing Iran's position in the region. While the United States must guard against the threat Iran poses through subversive activities, it cannot maintain a universal policy aimed at isolating Teheran. The authors call for the United States to offer incentives, such as agreements on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as part of a "carrot and stick" approach which, they believe, will gain more for the United States than a policy of unrelenting hostility (28-29). Brzezinski, Scowcroft and Murphy conclude by calling for a "nuanced containment," a policy that would make an effort to seek real change in Iraq and Iranian behavior with the approach described above, and would also be less imposing for the GCC countries (i.e. a less visible U.S. military presence). The need to differentiate between the nature of the challenge posed by Iraq and that of Iran is echoed by Omar Kader, 82 |