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Show Bureaucratic Accountability: A Look at Utah's Redevelopment Agencies Adam Caldwell edge, experience and intergovernmental ties than those elected officials who are making policy. Since elected officials are in office usually for a relatively short period of time, the lifelong bureaucrats can simply resist and wait out efforts for change. Finally, because bureaucrats have a monopoly on information about their agencies, they can control and manipulate reports and budgets that may appear to show change regardless of actual reality. Wood argues that it is not a question of whether bureaucracies respond to elected political institutions, but when, how, and why they respond to them. If there is a response it must then be asked whether these changes are merely symbolic or if there is an actual political tool at work. This model of bureaucratic response to elected officials will be useful for assessing the relationship between the redevelopment agencies and the state legislature that passes legislation concerning the agencies. In another perspective, Marc Eisner and Kenneth Meier in "Presidential Control versus Bureaucratic Power: Explaining the Reagan Revolution in Antitrust" (1990), also address the issue of political control and the bureaucracies' ability to act as an independent policymaking force. They point out that bureaucracies are not simple unbiased organizations that neutrally implement the decisions made by higher political officials. Factors such as clarity of mandates, constituent ties of bureaucracies, and values of the experts will play a significant role in assessing the relationships between bureaucratic and elected political institutions. Burke's Typology A Typological Approach To further determine the accountability of decision makers, John Burke has put forward a typology that may usefully distinguish situations where discretion might be used. Because different kinds of bureaucratic conduct and responsibilities exist, there will be different amounts of discretion among the different bureaucracies. Burke has divided these different types of bureaucratic discretion into four different cells (1990, fig. 9.1). A chart and brief description of each cell is now presented. A more detailed explanation then follows. Nature of Source Governing the Exercise of Discretion (Burke, 1990, Figure 9.1) Level of Accountability External Sources Internal Norms Strong 1 Formal-Legal II Professional Weak III Fragmented Implementation IV Personal, Political and Moral Views Cell I is the traditional or formal-legal view of bureaucratic conduct. In this traditional view higher authorities, most often the elected officials, clearly define the norms for governing. The times in which discretion can be exercised are clearly defined. Finally, strong mechanisms are put in place to ensure accountability. Cell II brings professional expertise into the implementation process. Professionals exercise their responsibilities by setting guidelines and then demanding that others uphold those standards in their profession. In this cell there is always a strong sense of accountability to uphold their professional reputation and to ensure that others do so as well. Cell III is where external authorities attempt to define responsibilities, as seen in Cell I, but in this case accountability is often weak. In this cell any implementation is often fragmented and such policy decisions must be made by the lower level bureaucrats due to poor direction and guidance from those above. Cell IV is perhaps the most political, and therefore unpredictable. In this cell implementors' exercise of discretion is based on their own political or moral views and beliefs. Accountability for their actions is often weak. One purpose of this paper is to test this typology, to determine whether the typology helps us understand what to expect from bureaucratic agencies. Burke contends that it can also help in answering questions as to when officials should exercise discretion. For example, a bureaucrat's exercise of discretion in the conditions found in Cell I usually will be less justifiable than if that bureaucrat was under the conditions of Cell II. Once the four different cells are understood, decisions can be made as to the propriety of using discretion. By properly classifying each situation into its proper cell "we can begin to arrive at some prescriptive understanding of times when discretion is or is not justified" (138). From this, the level of accountability can be determined. Each cell is now considered in further detail. Cell I: The "Formal-Legal" View In Cell I external agents or higher authorities attempt to define bureaucratic responsibilities clearly and then exercise strong control over this bureaucratic activity during the implementation process. This process also could be considered micro-managing, in which higher authorities oversee small and sometimes seemingly trivial decisions. Burke suggests three factors for the conditions in Cell I to be met. The first condition is that the "distance" in the agency from the formation to implementation of the policy be relatively short. When it comes to the chain of command, some agencies have fairly short chains whereas other agencies are quite lengthy. Agencies with the shorter chains of command are more likely to be able to fit in Cell I. The second condition is that the organization itself is relatively non-complex. Factors such as actual number of employees and degree of clarity of organizational powers would need to be consid- 30 |