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Show Women's Movements during Times of Political Chance Erica Baca clearly understand and explain women's movements (1985). Strategic gender interests form as an alternative to a woman's subordinate role; they change her role in society. For women in Peru or Brazil, strategic interests include freedom over reproductive rights, the establishment of political and legal equality, the eradication of legal forms of discrimination, and the institution of laws prohibiting violence against women. Strategic interests usually coincide with long-term feminist initiatives to eliminate women's subordination in society (232-233). Practical gender interests arise from the existing condition of women within the sexual division of labor. These interests overlook the philosophical injustices of the subordination of women and focus on the immediate needs of a woman in her societal role. Thus, practical gender interests often include matters of public welfare, such as food shortages or insufficient day care (233). These categories are useful because the social distribution of strategic and practical gender interests is highly susceptible to class conditions. Upper-class and middle-class women who have the financial means to satisfy their practical gender interests are more likely to adopt strategic gender interests. Lower-class women who are struggling to feed their children are not likely to mobilize against the objectification of women in the Miss Universe Contest. Molyneux also offers additional arguments as to why multi-class women's movements are unlikely to work. During times of political upheaval, women are more likely to suffer due to their class than to their gender. Thus, political movements are more likely to gain mass support if they are based on class rather than on gender. Furthermore, any unities that form between classes rely heavily on the status quo of class relations. These movements face devastation if class conflict creates an imbalance (234-235). Given this analysis it seems that single-class women's movements have a higher chance of success for two main reasons. First, women from a single class share the same interests. Thus, they will have a solid and uncompromised basis for political mobilization. Second, a single-class movement avoids the hassle of maintaining multi-class relations. It also sidesteps the possibility of a breakup due to inter-class conflict. However, it is impossible to ignore the fact that a multi-class women's organization would have the numerical advantage. Mass popular appeal is a great asset, especially during political transition. It is likely that new political leaders will wish to gain the widespread support of the people. If a movement gains extensive support, its demands conceivably will be implemented into public policy. Molyneux briefly alludes to a formula for a multi-class political movement that could produce political change. She suggests that practical gender interests could be transformed into strategic gender interests. For example, if overpopulating causes food shortages, the women could advocate solving this problem through more liberal reproductive rights. This would create a purpose that lower, middle and upper classes could work on together. Ideally, this type of organization would be the most successful because it would have a large and stable base of support. Theoretically, there are strong cases for either single-class or multi-class women's movements. The political activity of women in Peru and Brazil during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s presents an ideal laboratory for testing these propositions about the impact of class on the success of women's movements. The following background, discussion and analysis of Peru and Brazil are intended to offer insight into the class question. The Peruvian Case Backgroi'nd on Peri"vtan Political Change Peru's political transition began in 1968 when General Juan Velasco Alvarado gained power as a result of a military coup. Major reforms were instituted during the period between 1968 and 1975. This period is characterized as a bourgeois revolution that was transformed into state capitalism. The feudal-like aspects of society were replaced by a capitalist-dominated society. But the transition to state capitalism resulted in benefits to the middle class at the expense of the elite, and the lower classes received little assistance from the new government. These changes gave the middle class the optimism and the opportunities to mobilize politically (Cubitt 1988, 196-199). In 1975, a counter-military coup replaced Velasco with General Francisco Morales Bermudez. Bermudez scaled back Velasco's reformist initiatives and began a transformation toward a democratic government in Peru. Democratic reforms were meant to please political elites, but the military had no intention of letting democracy threaten their hold on the government. Therefore, despite a promise to allow party organization, this half-hearted transition to democracy was rocky. In 1978, the government suppressed leftist party unions who objected to the military regime's economic policies. The government also shut down some anti-military newspapers and other publications (Dietz 1992, 241-243). After the 1978 election, the regime still held a vast amount of power in the government. Leftist parties were unable to reach a consensus sufficient to unite themselves as a political force (244). Despite instability, the democratic regime held onto power in the face of turbulent opposition in the 1980s (237). In 1980, Sendero Luminoso, a guerrilla group also known as the Shining Path, began a campaign to destroy the physical infrastructure of Peru and to eliminate competing forms of grassroots leadership. During the decade, Sendero Luminoso killed at least 17,763 people, including a significant amount of grassroots leaders. Fear of the Sendero Luminoso caused many politically active women to abandon ties to political organizations (Barrig 1994, 170-171). Women's Organizations in Peru The political atmosphere created a problematic environment in which women could mobilize. Women's mobilization 8 |