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Show Hinckley Journal of Politics Autumn 1998 The question then arises as to whether this daily discretion is good or bad. Burke suggests that there is significant evidence that the exercise of discretion can contribute to the policy process in a positive manner. Better known as the "bottom-up" approach, advocates see usefulness in the policy implementors' playing an active role in defining the very policies they have responsibility to implement. In doing so, they provide positive benefits in defining policy as well as enhancing it. Such a benefit from this approach could be in the policy implementors having the discretion to do that which they feel is in the best interest of their particular community or agency. Although it can be agreed that bureaucrats exercise discretion on a daily basis, a question arises as to the extent of their discretion. In the end, is there a net loss or gain in benefits from the exercise of discretion? Is this loss or gain intensified with heightened levels of discretion? Burke suggests that while one could argue that bureaucratic discretion always serves the policy implementation process well, arguing such would avoid a discussion as to democratic rule, because it would negate the very purpose of electing officials to determine public policy. To such a discussion about discretion, several questions inevitably arise. Does the bureaucratic exercise of discretion result in fair treatment of all people involved? Does the exercise of discretion serve the public interest? Burke points out that while the traditional or formal-legal approach "has been faulted for assuming that discretion threatened democratic rule, to suggest that all exercises of discretion serve public policy is equally suspect" (1990, 134). Defining the Public Interest If bureaucratic agencies use their discretion in fulfilling public interest, it would be helpful if the concept of public interest were reasonably defined. Specifically, it must be defined clearly enough so that bureaucratic agencies then can use their discretion in the pursuit of coherent and relatively concrete objectives. As Kenneth Warren suggests in Administrative Law in the Political System, the problem with defining public interest is that the actual term often has been defined in "radically different and often contradictory ways" (1997, 69). At the same time, many have argued that the concept of public interest is too vague to have any practical utility. The concept of public interest often is defined as the will of the majority of the voters at the particular time a decision is to be made. Warren, however, expands upon this definition of public policy. He suggests that the regulatory agencies in most situations can use a simple cost-benefit analysis to determine public interest. This can be achieved by asking a few simple questions. "What are the costs? To whom? What are the comparative benefits?" (70). While this cannot always be measured in economic terms it certainly suggests that all affected parties must be considered. A cost-benefit analysis is also not intended to imply a zero-sum game because it is very possible that all could either win or lose from such decisions. However, when one group stands to receive significant economic gains at a financial cost to the public, bureaucrats then should draw a reasonable conclusion as to whether such an activity would be detrimental to the public interest. Once the bureaucratic agency has conducted an informal cost-benefit analysis, the agency must then take into consideration other factors that make up the public interest. Examples of such factors include efficiency and a person's individual rights as defined by modern judicial interpretation. While such values do not automatically tell bureaucrats what to do on a case-by-case basis, they do provide some guidelines to follow in pursuing the public's interest. When redevelopment agencies use their discretion in determining whether a project will go forward, such questions need to be asked. Often special interest groups have been given a disproportionate say in determining what is in the public's interest. If bureaucratic agencies fail to conduct this public interest test, questions arise as to the accountability of such bureaucratic decision makers. Concepts of Accoiintability There are a few writings that would be beneficial to discuss at this point. Much has been written on the relationship between the voters, elected officials, bureaucracies, and those who are regulated. A few writings have been selected to add perspective to this topic here. Marver Bernstein (1955) asserts a perspective that needs consideration in the process of determining accountability. In his "life cycle" theory of regulation he argues that regulatory agencies eventually will become captives of the industry they regulate. This co-optation generally will happen in a series of steps. The agency starts out in a period of "gestation" in which there is generally a fervor in the agency for reform and adoption of legislative mandates. This is then followed by the "youthful" stage in which policy and program development comes to an end, but zealous enforcement of previous policy continues. The third stage is that of "maturity." This comes about from lethargy and political isolation in which the agency finally becomes captive to those whom it regulates. Finally, the agency will enter "old age," during which its primary mission becomes a battle to maintain the status quo for not only the agency but those that the agency regulates as well (Greer 1983). The "life cycle" perspective concludes that bureaucratic agencies eventually become less accountable to their regulatory overseers. More recently, B. Dan Wood (1988) examined such issues in his article on "Principals, Bureaucrats, and Responsiveness in Clean Air Enforcements." In addressing the question of how responsible bureaucrats are to elected political institutions, he points out that the answers are often contrasting. Bureaucracies could even be considered as an informal fourth branch of government. Elected leaders are dependent on career bureaucrats, and so can effect little change. This is because bureaucrats often have more knowl- 29 |
