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Show Dual Containment: Successes, Failures, and Prospects for Changes in Policy David Walsh may lead some to turn to militant Islam as an alternative to pro-Western regimes, which are seen as corrupt and indifferent to the plight of their citizens. The Persian Gulf is an area of vital importance to the United States. Nearly two-thirds of the world's oil reserves are located in the Gulf. If these supplies were endangered, the security of the United States would be severely undermined. A cutoff of oil shipments to the United States would have harmful effects on its economy, but a loss of access to these shipments for Western Europe and Japan would be far worse. A sudden suspension of oil supplies to these countries, which rely even more on Persian Gulf oil for their economic growth and well-being than does the United States, would cause massive economic disruption. Because the world's economies are so intertwined, the consequences for the United States would be disastrous. As a result, the United States has made the protection of the Persian Gulf a vital national interest. Dual containment is the centerpiece of U.S. policy in the region, and given the controversy that has risen regarding its effectiveness, an examination of this policy is of the utmost importance. This article examines the dual containment policy, describes its strengths and weaknesses, and suggests a modification of this approach. Iraq will remain a threat as long as Saddam remains in power. If Saddam and the Baath Party fall from power, a significant threat to the Gulf will have been eliminated, and additional sources of petroleum made available on the international market. As for Iran, significant changes have occurred. The May 1997 elections have revealed cracks in the Islamic Government's strength. Increased popular discontent could further erode support. Liberalization, perhaps even improved relations with the United States, is likely to continue, and this would present Washington with an opportunity for rapprochement with Teheran. The United States should approach Iran as it did the Soviet Union in the early 1970s. Containment should remain intact, due to improvements in Iranian naval and air forces. Optimistically, a thaw in relations could reduce the danger of conflict in the region. To combat Islamic revolution, the United States should adopt a policy that supports liberalization in pro-American Gulf countries such as Kuwait. Such policies should emphasize political and economic reforms that alleviate conditions of poverty and marginalization. Doing so will eliminate the breeding grounds of militant Islam. Another issue facing the United States in the Middle East is the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process. In forming a settlement that would create a democratic Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the United States will provide an alternative to militant Islam's anti-American agenda as well as build an image of working toward reform and justice in the Middle East. Progress toward such a settlement, which has been jeopardized over the past year, must continue with renewed vigor. The United States must lead efforts to support this process. By retaining some elements of dual contain- ment, and replacing others with a different approach, the United States stands to enhance its security-and promote its values-much more effectively in the Persian Gulf. U.S. Interest in the Persian Gulf, 1945-93 American activity in the Persian Gulf can be traced back to the early 19th Century. During the Cold War, the United States began to involve itself to a greater degree in the region. At the end of World War II, Great Britain was the key external power in the Persian Gulf, as it had been for nearly a century. From bases throughout the Gulf and the adjoining Indian Ocean, most notably Aden, Sharijah and Trinco-malee, the mighty Royal Navy controlled the seas, allowing London to dispatch forces to trouble spots in times of crisis. The U.S. Navy maintained a small force of destroyers and destroyer escorts in the Gulf, based at Bahrain. But this presence was small compared to that of Britain, and served mainly to "show the flag" of the United States in the region, necessitated by the expanding Cold War between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union. With Britain providing the bulk of the Western military presence in the Gulf, and with a lack of any substantial Soviet threat (particularly after the U.S.S.R. withdrew its troops from Iranian Azerbaijan under Western pressure in 1946), American interests were largely economic. The Arabian-American Oil Company (ARAM-CO) gave the United States access to cheap oil (and significant profits) in Saudi Arabia, while the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) controlled oil production in Iran. When crises did occur in the Gulf, they were dealt with swiftly. When Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh nationalized AIOC in 1951, the British began planning to oust him. In 1953, Britain's MI6 intelligence service, with the support of the CIA, staged a coup that saw Mossadegh overthrown and the Shah put firmly in control of the country. When Iraq threatened Kuwait in 1961, British forces arrived in the small emirate to prevent Iraqi aggression. In spite of Britain's role as the Gulf's protector, the United States began to expand its role in the region from largely economic to political and military as well. As Daniel Yergin (1993, 427) writes, "American leaders and policymakers were also moving toward a much wider definition of national security-one that reflected the realities of the postwar balance of power, the growing clash with the Soviet Union, and the evident fact that the mantle was passing from Britain to the United States, which was now by far the preeminent power in the world." During the 1960s, the British maintained their role in the Gulf, which was fortunate due to the costly and protracted involvement of the United States in Vietnam. By the end of the decade, the United States found that it had to review its policies toward and role in the Persian Gulf. Historian Michael A. Palmer (1992, 86) cites three reasons for this. First, Great Britain, faced with economic trouble and anxious to reduce its overseas commitments as a result, began 76 |
