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Show Dual Containment: Successes, Failures, and Prospects for Changes in Policy David Walsh essary, since the United States has made the protection of Kurds in Iraq an issue of policy in the region. To achieve this, agreements must be worked out with a post-Saddam government, which would place strict limits on any Iraqi forces stationed there (for defense of its northern territory), see a Kurdish police force created to maintain order, and provide for the establishment of a Kurdish authority for management of local political affairs (i.e. a parliament). Washington should make Kurdish autonomy an issue in negotiations with a post-Saddam regime for normalization of relations. Indeed, by giving such a government incentives for recognition of Kurdish autonomy (improved relations, lifting of U.N. sanctions, etc.), as well as guarantees of Iraqi sovereignty (refusal to create an independent Kurdish state that would draw opposition from Iraq as well as Turkey, a key ally), a key U.S. objective in its Persian Gulf policy, protection of the Kurds in northern Iraq, will have been met. Such an approach toward Iraq, rather than a containment policy that does not meet American objectives and that has been circumscribed by U.S. allies, will serve to enhance the security of the Persian Gulf, the overriding priority of U.S. policymakers. With Iran, the situation is different. The Islamic Republic has faced serious internal problems-protests, a loss of revolutionary fervor, dissatisfaction with the government due to its style of leadership and economic difficulties-and has had to release the pressure through elections. The victory of Mohammed Khatami, a moderate, in the presidential elections in May 1997, sent a clear signal that Iranians desire changes in their society. Although hardly a genuine democracy, Iran's present rulers know full well how threatening popular unrest can become, since they came to power by exploiting such opposition to the Shah's regime. Liberalization will be needed in order to maintain stability. This might include overtures toward the United States. A policy of containment is needed toward Iran, due to its military buildup and its view of itself as the hegemonic power in the Gulf. However, this policy should be moderated. There exists a historical precedent for such a change. During the Cold War in the early 1970s, the Nixon Administration, recognizing that U.S. containment policy had to change, initiated a period of detente with the Soviet Union. This preserved containment while allowing the United States to avoid some of its costs, such as military intervention in developing nations. A similar approach toward Iran should occur. Containment today aims to shut Iran off from the rest of the world and to force change through total isolation. As we have seen, the policy has not accomplished these goals. Indeed, Iran now enjoys significant trade relations with many of its neighbors and with a number of the United States's closest allies. Secondary boycott legislation, such as the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, has alienated American allies and strained relations between them and Washington. A rapprochement with Teheran is needed. Such an effort must be based on the understanding that both the United States and Iran share certain goals in the Persian Gulf, some of them long-term. As Jahangir Amuzegar writes: Both countries have a vital interest in the free flow of oil through the Persian Gulf and the avoidance of maritime incidents. Both need each other geopolitically, as the twin pillars of a regional counterbalance to Russia's potentially expansionist aspirations within the Commonwealth of Independent States and toward the warm waters of the Persian Gulf. And, finally, both countries can fruitfully cooperate in developing and transporting the energy resources of the Central Asian states and the Caucasus, reducing those nations' dependence on Russia (1997, 40). The United States can make overtures toward Iran in the United Nations, while supporting Teheran's efforts to secure loans and credits from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Such strident U.S. legislation as the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act should be repealed, as it has succeeded only in harming U.S. policy. A political dialogue on Gulf security issues, through which the United States makes clear the vital nature of its interests in the Gulf and its willingness to protect them, will clearly establish the American position, allowing for a process in which other issues can be discussed. Economic investment by U.S. companies in Iran will bring significant profits, while Iranian oil will be an additional source of petroleum for the United States, additional exports perhaps driving down oil prices on world markets. At the same time, the United States should maintain a military presence in the Gulf, so as to deter Iran from any aggressive moves there. Iranian support of terrorist groups is a serious concern for the United States. However, economic sanctions against Iran meant to reduce its support of terrorism have not worked and will not work, for two reasons. First, the sanctions against Iran are not multilateral. Other nations continue to maintain trade relations with Iran, since they take an approach different from that of the United States; and secondary boycott legislation, as we have seen, will not bar these countries from their economic pursuits if they are determined to conduct them. Such legislation will lead only to hostility toward the United States. Therefore, Iran's economic ties will mitigate the effects of U.S. sanctions, and the goal of such sanctions will be thwarted. Second, economic sanctions will not have much effect on a state's support of terrorists. Second and even third parties may be used by a nation to support such groups. Overseas Iranian funds, in countries trading with it and not engaged in economic sanctions, can be used to purchase arms off the black market for use by terrorists, weapons that have no links to Iran itself (French or Belgian automatic rifles, for example). Without the ability to stop the use of such funds, direct sanctions, regardless of their economic impact, will not prevent support of terrorism by Iran. Support of armed opposition groups within Iran through covert action programs, or direct military moves against specified Iranian targets in the Persian Gulf (e.g. the refineries at Kharg Island), will have an immediate effect if Iranian support of terrorism continues. 86 |