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Show Hinckley Journal of Politics Autumn 1998 non-drug related problems, including poor relations with foreign officials (Wiarda 1996, 236). The competition between agencies over anti-narcotic responsibilities is now compounded by the number of new agencies that are entering the fight on drugs. This has been especially evident since the end of the cold war. Many agencies are searching for new missions and roles in the post-cold war era and finding it in the drug war. An example of this is the Department of Defense. The Defense Department initially resisted congressional efforts to enlist the military in the drug war. However, when faced with major budget cuts after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Defense Department embraced a drug-fighting mission, protecting some endangered programs by reclassify- ing them as drug-related__By 1991, the Defense Department had captured the largest share of the $2 billion drug-interdiction budget (Falco 1996, 122). This rise in the number of agencies involved in the drug war has complicated America's overall anti-drug policy and strategy. Besides the structural problems, other serious problems make America's foreign policy on drugs almost completely ineffective. U.S. policy makers realize that they alone cannot stop foreigners from growing and distributing drugs in America. The host countries must also take an active role in stopping the production of drugs and arresting major drug traffickers working from their countries. According to a Christopher S. Wren (1997, A13) article, the ONDCP director, Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey, told Congress that the United States must cooperate "in helping Mexico reform its corrupt police and weak legal systems, rather than merely criticizing their flaws." The problem, though, is that no country in Latin America has sufficiently strong government will, institutions, technology, or personnel to stop the drug traffickers located within its borders. In both Colombia and Mexico many of the top government officials are on the payrolls of the major drug Mafias. In fact, in Colombia, which has been called a "narco-democra-cy" because of widespread corruption throughout the government, the president, Ernesto Samper, was charged with running his campaign with money from drug mafias, as reported by the New York Times on October 21, 1997. He has not been the only high level government official paid by drug lords. Officials in many agencies, including the defense minister, and even in the Colombian Congress are on the Mafias' payroll (DEA 1996a). Obviously this impedes America's attempts at arresting these drug lords. Many high-level Mexican officials are also bribed by drug lords. The actual drug czar of Mexico was on the Mexican Federation's payroll. Also, Raul Salinas, brother of Mexico's former president, is heavily involved in drug trafficking, according to Wren (1997). Not only do many government officials lack the will to fight drugs, but also they actually are helping to promote drug production and trafficking. Mireya Navarro has reported that sometimes even U.S. officials are thought to be bribed, such as the two former federal officials charged with aiding and protecting the Cali Mafia (1997, A21). Corruption clearly is not limited to the top government officials. Government employees at all levels are bribed by drug traffickers to aid them in their efforts. Not only are they paid to "look the other way" and not enforce anti-narcotic laws, but also many government employees actually help and take an active part in drug production and trafficking. The United States is not just fighting the drug Mafias, it is also fighting members of the Mexican and Colombian governments. This makes it impossible for American agents to trust and rely on foreign agents to help in the fight against drugs (Andreas et al. 1991-92, 117). And, as noted above, in order to be successful the United States must have the help and support of the governments in countries where the drugs are grown and distributed. The lack of political will in some government officials to fight drugs is a result not of bribes, but of their own cultures and perspectives. In many Latin American countries drugs are not as significant a problem as they are in the United States. They see drugs as a U.S. problem, not as their problem. Also, many Latin American countries do not have strict laws against drug use. For example, in 1994 the Colombian Constitutional Court ruled to depenalize the personal use of drugs. The United States cannot force its laws on other countries. The DEA has come into conflict with several governments in the past over this issue. Often the U.S. anti-drug goals are not shared by the countries in which the United States hopes to carry out its goals (114-115). Another reason why Latin American governments and their people are unwilling to aid the United States in the drug war, is the large economic value drug production and trade have in those countries. If government officials cracked down on drug production, there would be a major economic collapse and social unrest (DEA 1997c; INL 1996). In developing countries where money is needed for investment and growth, drugs are a major source of income and for balance of payments. Peasants cannot be convinced to grow other crops because there is no substitute that earns as much profit as coca production. These peasants earn so little that they are not willing to give up the added money they make by growing coca. And government officials are not willing to force peasants to stop growing coca, given the economic value the drug industry brings to the population and government as a whole. It is not economically rational nor feasible for peasants and government officials to stop the drug industry (Andreas et al. 1991-92, 113). Drugs are attractive not only because of the money they bring but also because of the drug lords themselves. In many areas of Latin America drug traffickers are not seen as evil but are often well-liked. "Often with their drug earnings they sponsor churches, orphanages, hospitals, schools, municipal works, soccer teams, and stadiums" (Wiarda 1996, 235). In Mexico, in summer 1996, many people who came from states 63 |
