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Show 392 GENERAL SUMMARY PART H. his pa:st and future actions and motives,-of approving of some and disapproving of others; and tho fact that man is the one being who with certainty can be thns designated makes the greatest of all distinctions between him and the lower animals. But in our third chapter I have endeavoured to shew that the moral sense follows, :firstly, from the endurjng and always present nature of the social instincts, in which respect n:an agrees with the lower animals; and secondly, from ~Is mental faculties being highly active and his impresSIOns. of past events extremely vivid, in which respects he differs from the lower animals. Owino- to this condition of mind, man cannot avoid looking backwards and comparing the impressions of past events and actions. He also continually looks forward. Hence after some temporary desire or passion has mastered his social instincts, be will reflect and compare the now weakened imJ?res.sio~ of such past impulses, with the over present soCJal mstmct ; and ho will' then feel that sense of dis-satisfaction which all unsatisfied instincts leave behind them. Consequently he resolves to act differently for ~he future-and this is conscience. Any instinct which IS permanently stronger or more endurino- than another • • b ' ?1vcs nse to a feeling which we express by saying that 1t ought to be obeyed. A pointer dog, if able to reflect ?n his past conduct, would say to himself, I ought (as mdeed we say of him) to have pointed at that hare and not have yielded to the passing temptation of hunting it. Social animals are partly impelled by a wish to aid the members of the same community in a general manner, but more commonly to perform certain definite a?tion.s. Man is impelled by the same general wish to mel h~s fellows, but has few or no special instincts. He d1ffers also from the lower animals. in being able: CIIAP. XXI. AND CONCLUDING REMARKS. 393 to express his desires by words, which thus become the guide to the aiel required and bestowed: T~e motive to o-ive aid is likewise somewhat modified m man: it no blonger consists solely of a blind ins6~ctiveimpulse, but is largely influenced by the . p1:mse or blame of his fellow men. Both the appreCJatwn and the bestowal of praise and blame rest on sympathy;. and this emotion, as we have seen, is one of the most important elements of the social instincts. Sympathy,. thouo-h gained as an instinct, is also much strengthened by e~ercise or habit. As all men desire their own happiness, praise or blame is bestowed on actions and motives, according as they lead to this end; and as happiness is an essential part of tho general good, thegreatest- happiness principle indirectly servos as a nearly safe standard of right and wrong. As the reasoning powers advance and experience is gained, the moreremote effects of certain lines of conduct on the character of the individual, and on the general good, are perceived ; and then the self-regarding virtues,. from coming within the scope of public opinion, receive praise, and their opposites receive blame. But with the less civilised nations reason often errs, and many bad customs and base superstitions come within the samescope, and consequently are esteemed as high virtues, and their breach as heavy crimes. The moral faculties are generally esteemed, and with justice, as of higher value than the intellectual powers. But we should always bear in mind that the activity of the mind in vividly recalling past impressions is one of the fundamental though secondary bases of conscience. 1'his fact affords the strongest argument for educating and stimulating in all possible ways the intellectua~ faculties of every human being. No doubt a man with a torpid mind, if his social affections and sympathies are- |