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Show Hinckley Journal of Politics Autumn 1998 punish these countries for support of terrorism and attempts to procure weapons of mass destruction (Amuzegar 1997, 36). Politically, the United States sought the support of its NATO allies, as well as that of countries such as Japan, China and Russia. This included participation (by the NATO countries) in military deployments and in economic sanctions. The United States also continued to strengthen security links with the nations of the Persian Gulf, organized into the GCC. It also tried to influence events inside Iraq and Iran. Covert action programs had been underway inside Iran since the 1980s, though they met with little success. The Bush Administration had initiated a $40 million program against Saddam's regime, including support for coup efforts, but these had yielded few results. The Clinton Administration continued the program, albeit at lower levels ($20 million in funding, for example), hoping to threaten Saddam's position in Iraq and divert his attention away from hostile moves toward his neighbors (Richelson 1995, 364). Dual containment has been pursued by the United States over the past five years. While it has apparently prevented Iraqi aggression and overt Iranian threats to the security of the Persian Gulf, its record has been mixed. Many of America's closest allies have opposed economic sanctions against Iran, believing that they will not succeed in containing Iranian ambitions in the region. Furthermore, these allies, most notably the Western European countries, Canada, and Japan, have been enjoying profitable trade relations with Iran, and they are upset by U.S. attempts to curtail these relations, since they do not share the United States' view of Iran. The threat to Gulf security comes not only from Iraq and Iran, but also from within the countries of the Gulf. The bombings of U.S. facilities in Saudi Arabia in 1995 and 1996 are evidence of militant Islamic insurgency, which could threaten the stability of the GCC countries and thus the oil supplies of the region. By concentrating on Iraq and Iran, many argue, the United States is ignoring a dangerous internal threat to Gulf security, just as it ignored the Islamic revolutionary fervor that led to the overthrow of the Shah of Iran. Recently, many esteemed foreign policy analysts, among them Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Advisor during the Carter Administration, have called for an alternative to the policy of dual containment. Others, however, argue for the continuation of dual containment. These positions are analyzed in the next two sections of the paper. The Case for Dual Containment In some circles, dual containment has been hailed as a success. The combination of military deployment in the Persian Gulf, economic sanctions against Iraq and Iran, the support of allies in the political arena, and even covert action have weakened these countries, thus reducing the threat they pose to the region. Indeed, the only complaint heard regarding dual containment is that the Clinton Administration has not been tough enough in pursuing this policy. A 1994 Heritage Foundation report chastised the Administration for failing to secure greater European and Japanese cooperation in its efforts toward Iran, citing significant trade relations and investments. The report went on to list several policy recommendations toward Iran, including a strengthening of economic sanctions, maintenance of a strong military presence in the Gulf, support of opposition groups, a hard line on terrorism, and a refusal to normalize relations until Iranian foreign policy is changed significantly (Phillips 1994, 2-3). If dual containment is strengthened, its proponents argue, the changes desired by the United States will come about sooner rather than later. In Iraq, the opposition to Saddam's rule in the military and among the country's Kurds and Shi'a will lead to his downfall. In Iran, opposition to the Islamic Republic, which has spread through many segments of society, will increase. Its leaders will be forced to reconsider their domestic and foreign policies, thus leading to an improved relationship with the United States. This would concentrate on maintaining stability in the Gulf, rather than the subversion of the nations bordering it. The United States, according to analysts at the Heritage Foundation, should take advantage of reduced oil prices and internal dissent, making dual containment as concrete as possible against Iran (11). The danger from Iraq is obvious. In 1980 and in 1990, Saddam Hussein launched reckless and ultimately disastrous invasions against his neighbors, disregarding any logical view of the balance of power or the costs to be incurred from such ventures. Iraq's Baath Party, which Saddam heads, is made up of ruthless, power-hungry men who continue to look with covetous eyes at their neighbors in the Gulf. As Anthony Cordesman, Director of the Middle East Dynamic Net Assessment Project for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, has written, "Any U.S. strategy towards Iraq must recognize the fact that Iraq will remain a revanchist (reactionary) state as long as it is under the control of Saddam Hussein or other members of his present ruling elite (i.e. the Baath Party)" (Cordesman 1996, 1). Iraqi capabilities, therefore, are not as important as Iraqi intentions. Nor have Iraqi capabilities dwindled to such a point that they cannot threaten its neighbors or U.S. forces. Cordesman writes: Iraq's current military weakness does not deprive it of the ability to fight a number of types of war that do not involve committing major forces against the organized opposition of Western and Southern Gulf (Saudi, Kuwaiti, etc.) forces. It can fight irregular or unconventional forms of war. The use of third party terrorists, extremists, and proxies offers Iraq both a means of revenge and far more security than large-scale military action, so does playing a spoiler role at the political level, and financing political rivals to its enemies in the southern Gulf and rest of the Arab world. The need to weaken Saddam's regime and the position of power of the ruling elite is necessary for the United States to take into account when considering Gulf security. Iran also presents a threat to the Gulf due to its view of itself as the preeminent power in the region. The United .81 |
