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Show Dual Containment: Successes, Failures, and Prospects for Changes in Policy David Walsh Covert Action The Clinton Administration has scaled down the Bush Administration's efforts in Iraq and covert action programs in Iran have been low-level. Nonetheless, covert action remains an option for some CIA links to Kurdish guerrilla groups such as Massoud Barzani's Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Though these groups are rivals, they are part of the Kurdish National Congress, which coordinates various Kurdish groups. However, the division between these groups, which has included major combat (and Iraqi support for the KDP), complicates U.S. efforts to build a Kurdish insurgency strong enough to threaten Saddam's hold on northern Iraq. Dual containment, therefore, is a policy that involves various elements and is affected by concerns both within and without the Persian Gulf. More than five years after it was first implemented, dual containment aroused much debate over whether it should continue in its present form. Supporters argue that it is successful and should remain unchanged, since they believe that it will accomplish its goals before long and it is the only way to prevent Iraqi or Iranian expansionism. Opponents believe that dual containment has not succeeded in achieving its goals, that it is damaging our relations with our allies, and that a new approach to Persian Gulf security is needed. Both sides of this argument are examined below, after the history of dual containment is discussed. Dual Containment-A History When the Clinton Administration took office in 1993, it found itself with a foreign policy challenge in the Persian Gulf. Iraq had been defeated in the Gulf War, but Saddam Hussein remained firmly in control of the country. Iran, though weakened by its long war with Iraq and by various embargoes, had begun to recover economically, while increasing its military strength. The obvious question in Washington centered on how to confront this situation. At this time, the United States began to see the Persian Gulf as part of its overall strategy for Middle Eastern peace initiatives. The Madrid Conference of 1991 had seen significant breakthroughs in the peace process involving Israel, its Arab neighbors, and the Palestinians. The Clinton Administration established a policy of dual containment in the Persian Gulf in order to prevent further Iraqi aggression akin to that which had occurred in 1990 against Kuwait, and to deter Iran from threatening the United States and its allies in the Gulf. Dual containment would prevent Iraq and Iran from involving themselves in regional political efforts, allowing Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf countries to remain secure. The peace process, meanwhile, would strengthen ties between Israel and its Arab neighbors, while leading to the establishment of a Palestinian state. This would lead to a detente between Israel and formerly hostile states throughout the region, and thus undermine the position of such states as Iraq and Iran that oppose Israel's existence (Brzezinski, Murphy and Scowcroft 1997, 22). Dual containment and the peace process would enable the United States to strengthen its interests in the Middle East in six key areas: 1) protecting access to vital global oil supplies; 2) promoting Middle East political and economic development; 3) enhancing regional stability by providing leadership in the peace process; 4) reducing the spread of weapons of mass destruction; 5) cooperating with regional powers to combat terrorism (both dual containment and the peace process would enhance the U.S. position here); and 6) removing the central issues which fuel political fanaticism (the peace process would play the leading role in this) (Middle East Policy Council nd). In implementing dual containment, the United States began a multifaceted approach. With regards to Iraq, the United States continued to enforce its no-fly zones, extending the southern zone north from the 32nd to the 33rd Parallel. It also stationed troops and prepositioned supplies in the region. The Central Command, which controls all U.S. forces in the Middle East and Indian Ocean, conducted numerous exercises in order to maintain its proficiency in defending the region. During 1995, Central Command (or CENTCOM) held a total of 76 exercises, more than any other U.S. military command (the European Command came in a distant second, with 47 exercises) (Binnendijk, et al. 1996, 121). These military deployments also served as a deterrent to Iran. Though most of the U.S. operations were routine, such as the no-fly zone patrols and support for Kurdish refugees, combat or near-combat situations arose from time to time. In October 1993, President Clinton ordered U.S. Navy ships to launch a cruise missile strike against Baghdad, reacting to an assassination attempt on former President Bush when he visited Kuwait that year. In October 1994, when Saddam moved two Republican guard divisions to the Kuwaiti border, the United States responded with Operation Vigilant Warrior. A Marine Expeditionary Unit, elements of an Army division, a carrier battlegroup, and land-based aircraft were deployed to the Persian Gulf to deter Iraqi aggression (117). The Iraqis backed down, and the situation was stabilized. After Iraqi troops supported a Kurdish faction in its offensive against a rival group in August 1996, U.S. warships and B-52 bombers launched retaliatory cruise missile strikes against Iraqi installations. In addition to these military steps, the United States also sought to enforce economic sanctions against Iraq and Iran. The United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 687 in 1991, after the conclusion of the Gulf War, which called for Iraq to cease and desist from efforts to build weapons of mass destruction. This resolution froze Iraqi assets abroad and prevented Iraq from selling oil, since these funds could be used to support such programs. However, Saddam refused to meet the conditions for the lifting of sanctions, as well as four offers by the United Nations Security Council to ease the controls (57). The United States had imposed limited sanctions on Iran in the 1980s, but in 1996 it tightened these controls with the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, which sought to 80 |
