OCR Text |
Show Hinckley Journal of Politics Autumn 1998 solution to the drug problem comes from within the United States itself. Treatment programs and education programs have proven to be very effective (much more effective than U.S. efforts to stop drug production abroad). One third of those who stay in treatment longer than three months are drug-free a year after leaving treatment. Two-thirds are drug-free a year after treatment if the treatment lasts a year or longer. And some high-intensive therapy programs are even more successful. Although these treatment programs are expensive and are not 100 percent effective, they are definitely cheaper and more effective than supply-side reduction programs. The United States would do much better in its fight on drugs if it invested more money in developing a successful, long-term, intensive treatment program rather than investing it in drug control in foreign countries. A 1994 RAND study showed that '"treatment is far more effective than either interdiction or source-country programs in reducing cocaine consumption. Specifically, $34 million invested in treatment reduces annual cocaine use by the same amount as $366 million invested in interdiction or $783 million in source-country programs'" (quoted in Falco 1996, 129). Treatment programs are 10-20 times more effective than supply reduction programs. Another domestic program that has been very successful in reducing demand is education. In the past, prevention and education programs have significantly reduced new drug use among teenagers. These programs teach children to recognize pressures that influence them to use drugs or alcohol, and then teach the children how to resist the pressures. These programs are even more influential when they include a comprehensive effort by families, media, and the community. The family is especially important in reducing the use of drugs among teenagers. Strong family structure hinders the spread of drug use. In fact, this is one of the reasons that M. Delal Baer, director of the Mexico Project, gives in explaining why Mexican drug consumption is so low compared to U.S consumption. He said it was because of the many "intact nuclear families" in Mexico (1997, 146). If domestic drug policy is so successful and cheap compared to foreign drug policy, then why has spending for treatment programs and drug education programs been cut while the budget for foreign programs has grown? First, it is easier for Americans, and especially politicians, to blame foreigners for U.S. drug problems. Foreign enemies are far away, unknown and easy targets or scapegoats for failed United States policies. Second, public opinion encourages policy makers to take a strong stance against foreign drug traffickers. Members of the public view the drug problems in their cities and link that to foreign drug traffickers. Again, it is easier to blame a foreigner than to admit that it is our own fault that drugs have run rampant through our streets. Third, bureaucracies involved in foreign drug prevention do not want to lose their position in the drug war or the big budget that comes with that role. Bureaucracies such as the Department of Defense, that have found a new post-cold-war mission in the foreign- drug effort, fight any attempts to reduce spending for supply-side strategies. Not only will they lose much of their budget but they may also lose any role in foreign policy. This could lead to major cuts in their size and budget and, possibly, the extinction of some agencies (Falco 1996, 122). Peter Andreas, Eva Bertram, Morris Blachman, and Kenneth Sharpe summed it up best when they wrote in Foreign Policy: To admit the uncomfortable truth that no policy to reduce supply at the source of production can work without the full commitment of local actors, and that this commitment cannot be created by the United States, is to acknowledge that a supply-side strategy abroad cannot succeed in solving the problems of drug abuse and violence at home. Few drug officials would risk the budgets of their agencies, let alone their jobs, to argue that what they are doing is destined to fail. Perhaps most important, few politicians would be willing to risk being labeled "soft" on drugs or to surrender the convenience of blaming a foreign enemy (1991-92, 126). Even though the drug problem has long been considered a foreign policy issue, it really isn't. Although the supply of drugs comes from foreign countries, the United States has been and will continue to be ineffective in stopping that supply. Lack of political will, corruption, and weak judicial and enforcement institutions in Latin American countries make U.S. efforts ineffective. The United States cannot fight the supply of drugs alone. As long as there is a demand, there will be a supply. The supply source may change over time from one area to another, but it will be there constantly. U.S. agencies have little effect over the supply of drugs. However, America can control and influence the demand for drugs. No matter how many drugs are shipped into the United States, if there is no consumption or demand, then there will be no problem. It is the simple economic rule of supply and demand. The United States must overcome the bureaucratic politics that prevent the reduction of supply-side foreign policy programs and focus on domestic programs, such as treatment and education programs, that have a large impact on reducing demand for drugs, which in turn has a large impact on the overall U.S. drug problem. References Andreas, Peter R., Eva Bertram, Morris Blachman, and Kenneth Shape. 1991-92. "Dead-End Drug Wars." Foreign Policy. Issue 85 Winter, 106-128. Baer, M. Delal. 1997. "Misreading Mexico." Foreign Policy. Issue 108, Fall: 138-149. Butterfield, Fox. 1997. "Drugs in Homicide Rate Linked to Crack's Decline." New York Times. October 27, A18 Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). 1996. International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. Washington, D.C.: GPO, March. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). 1997a. International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. Washington, D.C.: GPO, March. 65 |