OCR Text |
Show COMPACT-REPORT BY CARPENTER-COLORADO A95 in the Supreme Court to settle controversies between States, as said by Mr. Justice Harlan in the foregoing case (p. 644): We cannot assume that the framers of the Constitution, while extending the judicial powei of the United States to controversies between two or more States of the Union and between a State of the Union and foreign states, intended to exempt a State altogether from suit by the General Government. The above statement followed an analysis of the position taken by Texas (p. 641): Texas insists that no such jurisdiction has been conferred upon this Court, and that the only mode in which the present dispute can be peaceably settled is by agreement, in some form, between the United States and that State. Of course, if no such agreement can be reached-and it seems that one is not probable-and if neither party will surrender its claim of authority and jurisdiction over the disputed territory the result, according to the defendant's theory of the Constitution, must be that the United States, in order to effect a settlement of this vexed question of boundary, must bring its suit in one of the courts of Texas * * * or that, in the end, there must be a trial of physical strength between the Government of the Union and Texas. The Court decided that, inasmuch as the State and the United States did not settle their controversy by compact, the Supreme Court had the power to determine the controversy between the United States and the State. The right to settle by compact proceeds upon the sovereignty of the State and the sovereignty of the Nation. As stated regarding another matter, "It is a matter between two sovereign powers" (U. S. v. La., 127 U. S. 182, 189). The following quotations bear upon this general subject of power and separate sovereignty: The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States, respectively, or to the people (Constitution of the United States, tenth amendment). It must be recollected that previous to the formation of the new Constitution we were divided into independent States, united for some purposes, but in most respects sovereign (Chief Justice Marshall in Sturgis v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 192). Reference has been made to the political situation of these States, anterior to its (Constitution] formation. It has been said that they were sovereign, were completely independent, and were connected with each other only by a league. This is tiue (Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 187). The United States are sovereign as to all th? powvrs of Government actually surrendered. Each State in the Union is sovereign as to all the powers reserved. It must necessarily be so, because the United States have no claim to any authority but such as the States have surrendered to them. Of course, the part not surrendered must remain as it did before (Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, 435). In America the powers of sovereignty are divided between the Government of the Union and those of the States. They are each sovereign with respect to the objects committed to it, and neither sovereign with respect to the objects com~ mitted to the other. (Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 410.) |
Source |
Original book: [State of Arizona, complainant v. State of California, Palo Verde Irrigation District, Coachella Valley County Water District, Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, City of Los Angeles, California, City of San Diego, California, and County of San Diego, California, defendants, United States of America, State of Nevada, State of New Mexico, State of Utah, interveners] : |