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Show A88 APPENDIX 210 BRIEF ON LAW OF INTERSTATE COMPACTS Powers of States To Enter into Compacts Compacts or agreements between the States are recognized by Article I, section 10, paragraph 3, of the Constitution of the United States, which provides: No State shall, without consent of Congress, * * * enter into any agreement or compact with another State. * * * Interstate controversies and differences respecting boundaries, fisheries, etc., have been frequently settled by interstate compact. Among the many boundary disputes so settled may be mentioned the following: Virginia and Pennsylvania, 1780 (11 Pet. 20); Virginia and Pennsylvania, 1784 (3 Dall. 425); Kentucky and Tennessee, 1820 (11 Pet. 207); Virginia and Tennessee, 1802 and 1856 (148 U. S. 503, 511, 516); Virginia and Maryland, 1785 (153 U. S. 155, 162). Of the compacts between States respecting the taking of fish in rivers forming the boundary between the two disputant States may be mentioned Washington and Oregon, Columbia River; Maryland and Virginia, Potomac River (153 U. S. 155). The States of New York and New Jersey settled their harbor differences by interstate compact. While all compacts which would in any way involve the Federal Government or its jurisdiction, property, etc., must be made with consent or approval of Congress in order to be binding, it has been suggested by the Supreme Court that compacts made between two States respecting matters in which the States alone are interested might be taken as binding without consent or approval of Congress (Stearns v. Minnesota 179 U. S. 223, 245; Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U. S. 503; Wharton v. Wise, 153 U. S. 155). For a full discussion respecting the rights of the States to enter into treaties or compacts, with consent of Congress, see Rhode Island v Massachusetts (12 Pet. 657, 725-731). In the case just cited the Supreme Court observed that when Congress has given its consent to two States to enter into a compact or agreement- then the States were in this respect restored to their original inherent sovereignty; such consent, being the sole limitation imposed by the Constitution, when given, left the States as they were before, as held by this court in Poole v. Fleeger (11 Pet. 209); whereby their compacts became of binding force, and finally settled the boundary between them; operating with the same effect as a treaty between sovereign powers. That is, that the boundaries so established and fixed by compact between nations, become conclusive upon all the subjects and citizens thereof, and bind their rights, and are to be treated to all intents and purposes, |
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Original book: [State of Arizona, complainant v. State of California, Palo Verde Irrigation District, Coachella Valley County Water District, Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, City of Los Angeles, California, City of San Diego, California, and County of San Diego, California, defendants, United States of America, State of Nevada, State of New Mexico, State of Utah, interveners] : |