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Show 702 HISTORY OK PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT tion, in any event, was only a temporary one. Also, speculation in Federal lands was hardly regarded as objectionable at the time.14 The reservation of lead might conceivably have been for military purposes, although at this time there seemed to be no immediate threat to the security of the new Nation. Perhaps it is more accurate to say that the mines were looked upon as a source of potential revenue.1"' This would be natural for a government recovering from the ravages of war. And, yet, only a small fraction of the mines was in fact reserved. In retrospect, the emphasis on precious metals may also seem strange, but quite obviously these alone were thought to be of value. This fact prompted the Supreme Court over a hundred years later to observe, in a discussion of the Ordinance, that ".. . non-precious metals have probably contributed as much or more to the general wealth of the country."1" Since the Ordinance was not re-enacted after the dissolution of the Continental Congress, the government's early mineral policy died a natural death. The new Congress did not concern itself with the disposition of the public domain except for three statutes in 1796, 1800, and 1804,17 none of which considered the mineral lands. The general power of Congress to dispose of its property without restriction was, of course, established in the new Constitution.18 An Experiment in Leasing: The Lead Mines 1807-1846 In I8071-* Congress passed a public land act which dealt primarily with land lying 14 Wright, The Galena Lead District: Federal Policy and Practice 1824-1847 5 (1966). 15 Id. at 6. w Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Sodcrberg, 188 U.S. 526,531 (1903). 17 1 Stat. 464 (1796) ; 2 Stat. 73 (1800) ; 2 Stat. 277 (1804). 18 U.S. Const, art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 19 2 Stat. 448 (1807). ' between the United States Military Tract and the Connecticut Reserve.2" The House Committee on Public Lands inserted in the final draft a special provision (Section 5) authorizing leasing of the lead mines in the Indiana Territory. Section 5 is not exactly reminiscent of modern leasing legislation. After reserving known lead mines (and contiguous lands) from future disposal, the act with no more detail simply empowered the President to "lease any lead mine . . . for a term not exceeding five years." Future grants of land in the territory were also prospectively declared void if known lead deposits existed prior to the sale. Although the act was intended primarily as a revenue measure, the political uncertainties inherent in an age which housed both Napoleon and a hostile England may have prompted legislation to insure an adequate supply of lead for ordnance requirements.21 The reservation was apparently thought to be self-executing, for no Executive order was ever issued setting aside specific lands. What is most astonishing about the act is that there was simply no plan for the administration of a leasing system. The contents of the leases were not specified. There was not even a hint as to the royalty which the government might expect. Leasing was thus off to a most inauspicious beginning. The Missouri lead mines were soon leased, however, and that experiment ended in disaster. By 1829, Congress abandoned leasing in Missouri (by then a state) and authorized the sale of the mines.22 It has been established that the Federal leasing law produced widespread resentment -"'The Connecticut Reserve consisted of land in Ohio which was not included in the state's original cession to the Federal government of her colonial charter claims. It was eventually ceded in 1800. See TREAT, supra note 11 at 319-25. The United States Military District is described on 239-43. :iSee Wright, supra note 14 at 8 (1966). 22 4 Stat. 364 (1829). |