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Show THE SANCTIONS DILEMMA: SADDAM vs. THE UN Amy DeFrank Why does the MIF intercept so few smugglers? A variety of factors contribute, including: Iranian complicity, the United Arab Emirates' (UAE) "revolving door," increasingly intelligent and innovative smugglers, the sheer volume of the smuggling, and very limited MIF resources. All of these difficulties can be illustrated through the following discussion of the process by which a vessel is queried, boarded and subsequently diverted if found to be carrying illegal cargo. A vessel acting under the authority of the MIF may issue a query to another vessel, typically outbound, in the Persian Gulf. If it appears that all is in order and there is no intelligence from other sources to suggest that the queried vessel is involved in illegal activities, then the ship is allowed to proceed. However, if any questions posed by the MIF are not answered to its satisfaction, or the vessel does not issue a reply, then it may be boarded by MIF personnel. In addition, the MIF occasionally possesses satellite photos of certain vessels, which clearly show them uploading oil from an illegal port or from another ship known to be involved in smuggling activities. Mina al Baqr is the only port through which oil exports have been authorized under the oil-for-food program in the Gulf. Therefore, if satellite photos exist of a queried vessel taking on oil at any other port, then that oil is illegal and intended for smuggling. Many smugglers go through a loading facility called Abu Plus, which receives its oil from the refinery Basarah. Basarah was destroyed in the 1998 air strikes, but has since been rebuilt and currently produces 140,000 barrels of oil per day, all of which is unauthorized (Department of State ZOOOb). Therefore, a vessel may be boarded on the basis of the intelligence gleaned from satellite photos. Yet, even if the MIF possesses evidence of smuggling, it is not always able to approach those vessels involved. The MIF is authorized to operate only in international waters and may not conduct surge operations (MIF naval operations which enter a nation's territorial waters), without the express permission of that country's government. For a country to acquiesce to such operations would be to allow the MIF (primarily the U.S. as it supplies the majority of the assets) to greatly infringe upon that country's territorial sovereignty. Therefore, the MIF can typically intercept smugglers only when they venture into international waters. Over the years, oil smugglers leaving Iraq have developed a very effective system allowing them to avoid coalition forces in the Gulf with the help of an old foe, Iran. Upon taking oil from an illegal loading facility, such as Abu Plus, or from another vessel, a smuggler may then enter Iranian territorial waters. Territorial waters are internationally recognized as extending outward twelve miles from a country's shore. The smuggler is then able to hug the coastline and remain in these waters until reaching the Strait of Hormuz. In this narrow waterway, the territorial waters of Iran and Oman overlap, allowing the smugglers to cross the Strait without ever entering international waters. They can then offload the oil in Oman or continue and exit the Gulf, thus leaving the operational jurisdiction of the MIF. By remaining in territorial waters for their entire journey, the smugglers effectively stay beyond the reach of MIF vessels. Yet it is only with the complicity of Iranian officials that the smugglers are able to operate in Iranian waters. According to reports, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard charges smugglers approximately fifty dollars per ton of oil, which buys passage through Iranian waters and provides falsified documents stating that the oil on board is Iranian rather than Iraqi (Global Intelligence Update 2000). The smugglers merely add this "fee" into the cost of doing business and then take advantage of a system that allows a large number of them to avoid entanglements with the MIF. If Iran were to crack down on smuggling through the Gulf, as it has sometimes done in the past at the urging of the UN and U.S., the amount of oil being illegally exported would drop dramatically. In what may be viewed as a political nod to the UN and U.S., Iran has on several occasions closed its waters to smugglers for periods, forcing them to use international waters. In fact, it did so in early 2000, though after a few months it reopened its waters to smugglers again, allowing large a number through. It is therefore apparent that the revenue Iran receives from the smugglers provides a powerful incentive for the country to aid the smugglers, and it may take a significant increase in political pressure on this issue for Iran to refuse passage on a more permanent basis. However, if a smuggler does not use this system and passes through international waters, it may be boarded. Once boarded, an inspection of the cargo is performed and crew members are interviewed. If illegal exports are found to be on board, then the ship must be diverted in accordance with UN regulations. Some may question how MIF personnel are able to determine if oil found on board is illegal Iraqi oil and not legitimate oil from a neighboring country such as Iran. The MIF is typically able to make such a determination on the basis of several factors. In many cases, documentation found on board the vessel (charts, logs, GPS plots, etc.) indicates from which port the oil was obtained. In other instances, the satellite imagery or other outside intelligence is available. Furthermore, often crew members will provide information to MIF personnel about the ship's activities. However, on occasion less evidence is available and/or the situation is particularly politically sensitive and additional proof is needed before a divert may be made. In these cases, samples of the suspect oil are taken and flown to the U.S. for analysis by labs in California. Scientists in the U.S. have developed a technique that enables them to pinpoint not only the oil's country of origin, but also the oilfield from which it originated. If the evidence collected proves the vessel boarded to be involved in smuggling operations, it is then diverted, not back to Iraq, but to a third country. The process of determining where to divert the vessel possesses its own difficulties. The country to which a smuggler is sent must first agree to accept the vessel, a task to which many Gulf countries are not always willing to agree. A country is most likely to accept a smuggler 28 |