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Show STANDING AT THE CROSSROADS: NATO IN THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY James Seaman ty alliance to become an organization apparently dedicated to peacekeeping. Secondly, the use of NATO troops in the former Yugoslavia means NATO has expanded the boundary of the area it considers part of its sphere. Significantly, Russia sees NATO expansion as a threat. Russia considers the countries of Eastern and Southeastern Europe to be within its sphere of influence. More importantly, the Russians view Eastern Europe as part of its security zone, protecting it from the West. Just as significantly, the Russians have traditionally seen the Serbs (currently at the heart of the Balkan conflict) as brothers, sharing a common Slavic and Christian Orthodox heritage. In October of 1996, the Russian Duma voted 307-0 in favor of a resolution warning that enlargement of NATO could trigger a serious crisis between Russia and the West (Kahl 1998, 23). In fact, Russia may find it has no choice but to rely on the leverage of its nuclear weapons to make up for its lack of conventional military capability. The Russians may also feel threatened economically by NATO's expansion eastward. Russia currently finds itself in a position of economic weakness. Simultaneously, Moscow finds itself being isolated by the West (the United States in particular) as its old Cold War enemy seeks to expand NATO eastward without offering an invitation to the Russians. This has the potential to rally nationalist sentiments in Russia, sentiments that may appear increasingly anti-American. As NATO expands to include the countries to Russia's west, Russia may increasingly find itself with nowhere to turn but within, perhaps to be swallowed by a resurgence of communism and/or nationalism. UNDERSTANDING THE RUSSIANS In understanding Russia's suspicion of NATO expansion, it is crucial to appreciate Russian history as a tragic story of invasion, violation, and exploitation from all sides: the east, the south, and particularly the west. In a 1931 speech, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin outlined the nature of Russia's historical abuse: She was beaten by the Mongol Khans, she was beaten by the Turkish beys, she was beaten by the Swedish feudal lords, she was beaten by the Polish and Lithuanian Gentry, she was beaten by the British and French capitalists, she was beaten by the Japanese barons (Adams 1986, 63). Ten years after this speech, Russia was the victim of the largest invasion in military history, as Hitler sent 150 divisions and over three million men across the Russian border in Operation Barbarossa (Beevor, 1998, 12-13). And this was a mere generation after the Kaiser's troops had penetrated deep into Russian territory, causing immense death and destruction in the first World War. Nor can the United States be judged innocent by the jury of Russian history, as 1918 saw President Woodrow Wilson send American troops into Russian Siberia to fight with Czarist loyalists against the Red Army (Service 1997, 102). Twenty-seven million dead in World War II left the Russians desperate to protect their flank against future invasion from the West. In this light, Stalin's insistence on Soviet-friendly regimes in Eastern Europe can be seen as more than crude Soviet aggression. After two world wars, and a lengthy history of bloody invasion, Russia saw it as a necessity to create a buffer-zone out of the vast plain between itself and Germany to offer protection not only from the Germans, but also from a historically hostile West. While the United States and its Western European allies viewed NATO as a justified defensive alliance in the face of a potentially threatening Soviet Union, Russia saw the alliance as offensive aggression. To the Russians, NATO simply fit into a pattern of Western hostility (Hixson 1995, 30). The crucial element in all of this history is that American intentions have been interpreted by the Russians differently from the Americans themselves. American ideology produces the American mindset through which these events are viewed. The Russian viewpoint is framed by the turbulent stream of Russian history. Therefore, it is practically inevitable that NATO expansion, in the manner in which it has thus far progressed, will be viewed suspiciously by Russia. Any American who struggles to understand the Russian opinion of NATO expansion should consider the likely American mood if the countries of South and Central America were to join into a defensive alliance, and not extend an invitation to the United States. Furthermore, to make this analogy legitimate, one would also have to imagine that the allied countries of Latin America were economically and militarily powerful, with a history of hostile behavior toward the United States. Indeed, with two huge oceans to the east and west, and with relatively weak military and/or economic entities to the north and south, it is very difficult for any American to understand the defensive attitude undertaken by the Russians. Russia's sense of isolation is deepened by the rejection of Russian requests to be granted membership in NATO. In 1992-93, Russian representatives expressed readiness to join NATO. Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev both spoke about entry into NATO as a long-term political goal (Meseznikov 1998, 99). Of course, these Russian overtures were not met with sincere consideration by the West. This rejection of Russia is based on the belief in many Western circles that Russia is too weak to oppose Western plans. This belief could prove especially dangerous, particularly if it leads to attempts to exploit Russia. The danger exists in the possibility of a resurgent Russia in the future. Under such circumstances as a Russian recovery, the United States and Western Europe may pay a heavy price for their current stance toward the Russians. America's current policy of NATO expansion eastward without (at this point) the likely possibility of extending an invitation to Russia must be viewed as a potential danger. A sense of alienation and isolation could potentially cause an adverse reaction among Russian leaders and the Russian peo- 78 |