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Show HINCKLEY JOURNAL OF POLITICS SPRING 2001 tion as during the Cold War. Consistent with realist thought, as the self-help needs of the international system increased, states became more concerned about providing for their own security. Given the continual competition and perceived threats from others, and with few guarantees of protection from stronger states, nuclear weapons are perceived by some states as the ultimate guarantor of security (Nye 1997, 187). CONFLICTING ARGUMENTS OVER PROLIFERATION THE CASE FOR PROLIFERATION Although there is considerable apprehension among realists regarding the possible consequences of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, it is not universally regarded as a reason for concern. Many analysts credit the possession of nuclear weapons as a key factor in preventing the Cold War from becoming "hot." The balance of terror between the United States and Soviet Union discouraged either side from introducing nuclear weapons into a conflict. Many hold that nuclear weapons will have a similar moderating effect in the future. A number of analysts make a case for allowing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Some go so far as to say that the international system would be stable if all states had such weapons. The foremost among those who advance an argument in favor of proliferation is Kenneth Waltz (Russett and Starr 1996, 315), who argues that the gradual spread of nuclear weapons could actually promote peace and security. However, Waltz is careful to note that he supports a gradual spread of nuclear weapons rather than a rapid spread or no spread. As a realist, he recognizes that states will tend to security as they see best. However, due largely to the number of states, including Brazil, Argentina, and South Africa, that can produce nuclear weapons but have not, Waltz is doubtful of the likelihood of widespread proliferation (Nye 1997, 187). Based on this view, Waltz (1993) argues that, for the most part, states should be allowed to tend to their own security as they see fit, except in particular cases where the pursuit of nuclear weapons could lead to regional instability. The majority of states will continue to feel more secure without a nuclear arsenal. For other states, nuclear weapons would provide them with greater protection than conventional weapons and allow them to behave more reasonably (1993, 527, 552-554). Due to the immense damage that can be caused by even a small number of nuclear warheads, the possible losses in a nuclear confrontation outweigh any possible gains. Given this, Waltz believes that the balance of terror that was so effective during the Cold War in preventing conflict between superpowers will likely continue to be a factor in the post-Cold War world. With the risk of a nuclear exchange making the possible costs of war extremely high, Waltz questions who would dare to start one. In addition, a nuclear state is more difficult (or is at least perceived to be more difficult) to defeat than is a state that does not possess nuclear weapons, thereby reducing the incidence of war even further. With such a capability, Waltz believes that nuclear weapons may make a defensive, rather than an offensive, ideal possible. Finally, Waltz argues that states gaining nuclear capabilities in the present and future will have more incentives to manage their weapons responsibly since they will be more aware of the risks involved in a nuclear confrontation than were earlier nuclear states (1993, 554-555). THE CASE AGAINST PROLIFERATION Other realists are more skeptical about the possible consequences of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is widely feared that as more states possess nuclear warheads, the possibility of their use also increases. Lincoln Wolfenstein and Lewis Dunn are among those who oppose further proliferation of nuclear weapons. Wolfenstein (1996) takes an extreme argument by saying that nuclear weapons should not only be prevented from proliferating, but should be eliminated entirely from the world in order to eliminate the danger of nuclear disaster. He argues that as long as countries maintain large stockpiles of weapons, one cannot rule out the possibility of their use, whether accidentally or deliberately. He points out that the history of false alarms is not reassuring in this regard. In addition, nuclear weapons are generally seen as non-usable in most wars, which brings into question the deterrent value of such weapons. In support of his argument, Wolfenstein cites the Korean War and the Gulf War as conflicts in which nuclear weapons neither deterred war nor influenced the outcome (1996, 263-265). The mere possession of such weapons, however, carries with it the risk of even a small-scale conflict escalating to a nuclear exchange. Dunn (1993) does not argue that there should be no nuclear weapons, but he is nonetheless concerned about the risks of nuclear weapons proliferation, particularly to conflict-prone regions such as the Middle East. Such a spread, coupled with high regional tensions, greatly increases the possibility that nuclear weapons will be used. Dunn is concerned that future nuclear states may include those with long-standing animosities, volatile leadership, or political instability, all of which heighten the risk that a miscalculation or breakdown in communications could threaten the nuclear peace (1993, 514-516). In addition, though third-world states that gain access to nuclear warheads may be well aware of the associated risks, there is a danger that such states would be deficient in both the technology and the resources to construct the extensive safety measures and devices adopted by the United States and the Soviet Union to reduce the threat of accidental or unauthorized use. Dunn is also concerned that the possession, or likelihood of possession, of such weapons could exacerbate tensions between unfriendly states and risk drawing stronger states into a conflict between regional enemies. A threat to use nuclear weapons may be used as an instrument of blackmail or coercion against a weaker opponent. Another risk is a preventive strike, with either nuclear or conventional weapons, by a state 45 |
