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Show TEN CHAIRS: NINE ARE LEATHER; ONE'S ELECTRIC. THE SUPREME COURT'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL JUSTICE IN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT Jackson Spencer Wixom of the Court appears to have lost its voice. In all Supreme Court cases, criminal and civil, a significant minority (at least four Justices) has reserved some power in the acceptance of certiorari petitions. With the death penalty, however, the power to stop a state from carrying out the execution rests only in the hands of the Court's majority at this stage. This procedure may hinder the Court's ability to grant procedural equality since the anti-death penalty minority has no voice. The case of Alpha Stephens alone is sufficient proof that some degree of inequality exists. The Court is so tightly bound by the rules for accepting habeas petitions and granting stays of execution that inmates' pleas may not receive the adequate substantive consideration they deserve. A TRICK To STAY ALIVE The Court's desire to standardize the appeals process is not without good reason. On November 9, 1999, an article by Joan Biskupic appeared in the Washington Post announcing the Court's refusal to accept certiorari petitions dealing with claims that housing inmates on death row for extended periods of time violated their Eighth Amendment rights (Biskupic 1999). The Court did not issue a formal reason as to why it denied certiorari on these particular cases, but Justice Thomas issued a statement in the Washington Times to clarify his position. He wrote, "I am unaware of any support in the American constitutional tradition or in this Court's precedent that a defendant can avail himself of the panoply of appeals and then complain when his execution is delayed" (Murray 1999). Justice Thomas went on to say that the United States Supreme Court develops "Byzantine death penalty jurisprudence," by permitting several levels of appeals to occur in the first place (Greenhouse 1999). Justice Breyer disagreed with the reasoning of Justices Thomas. He wrote in his dissent, "A growing number of courts outside the United States-courts that accept or assume the lawfulness of the death penalty-have held that lengthy delay.... renders ultimate execution inhuman, degrading, or unusually cruel" (Greenhouse 1999). In his dissent, Justice Breyer referred to two cases in particular that were part of those denied certiorari by the Court. The first, Moore v. Nebraska, involves Carey Dean Moore who has been on death row since being convicted of the 1979 murders of two cab drivers, Reuel Van Ness Jr. and Maynard Helgland. After a round of appeals, the federal courts felt that Nebraska's capital sentencing laws were too vague and granted Moore a new sentencing hearing in 1995. Moore was again sentenced to death, but these appeals and federal rulings had delayed his execution for fifteen years (Murray 1999). The second case is Knight v. Florida. Thomas Knight was originally convicted of abducting and murdering a Miami couple, Sydney and Lilian Ganz in 1974- While awaiting execution by electrocution six years later, Knight fatally stabbed a prison guard. In 1995, the llth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the trial jury should have considered Knight's traumatic and abusive childhood when sentencing him to death and they ordered a re-sentencing hearing. At the new hearing, Knight was once again sentenced to death. Thomas Knight's attorneys wrote in his petition of certiorari, "To execute someone after holding him for more than two decades in the agonizing suspense and close confinement reserved for those who are about to die is an inhuman, degrading punishment and a denial of the fundamental human dignity" (Murray 1999). The Supreme Courts of Jamaica, India and Zimbabwe have ruled that prolonged waiting on death row violates basic human rights. Justice Breyer feels that the United States should attempt to align itself with this international trend. In both cases referenced by Justice Breyer, the defendants were granted re-sentencing hearings due to rulings in federal courts that their original sentencing hearings were in some way unconstitutional. Justice Breyer's argument is that it was not multiple appeals that kept these inmates on death row for so long, but the fact that the federal judiciary delays in considering legitimate pleas. The argument over whether or not an extended death-row waiting period merits "cruel and unusual punishment" is one of the strongest justifications for the Court's streamlined appeals process. With decisions such as Sawyer and Barefoot, the Court displays in a loud and clear manner its desire to move the appeals process forward and to carry out scheduled executions. The tight procedures for the acceptance of certiorari petitions and for granting stays of execution help to remove inequality in the trial to execution period. This makes the process speedy for all death-row inmates and they are thus unable to play the "slow torture" card back against the justice system. In this sense, the Court should be commended for keeping a tight hold on the appeals system. CONCLUSION The Supreme Court must face many obstacles in its struggle to provide every American with "equal justice." They must consider the inequality that exists among individual cases when death penalty sentencing is governed by state legislatures. Gregg v. Georgia does not cover all Americans in one uniform blanket of justice. Some defendants are given softer sentences only because they commit crimes in states that object to capital punishment. At the same time, the Court must protect the legislative power of Congress and the rights of states. Federalism is a cherished part of our government and the Court must be careful not to overstep its authority. Approximately 3,335 people currently live on death row. The U.S. executed 45 people in 1996; it executed 74 in 1997, and 96 in 1999 (Snell 1998). If this trend continues, the Court's work in regard to death penalty cases will only continue to increase and the U.S. judicial process will continue to slow down. The Court must also examine the inconsistency that exists in granting certiorari to habeas petitions and in granti- 40 |