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Show THE SANCTIONS DILEMMA: SADDAM vs. THE UN Amy DeFrank trating the excess in which he indulges. Luxury cars have been provided for top government officials, along with extra rations and a plethora of other luxury goods, which benefit only those in Saddam's inner circle. Saddam openly uses the money gained from illegal activities to increase his considerable wealth, without applying it toward alleviating any of the numerous problems suffered by his people. Reports have also been received of Saddam using the illegal money to build up that which he desires most - strategic and tactical military capabilities. THE RISKS AND BENEFITS OF LIFTING SAGTIONS The suffering of the average Iraqi citizen, and what appears to some as the failure of the sanctions has caused many, to advocate lifting or substantially limiting the sanctions. However, this raises a very important question. What are the possible risks and rewards of lifting the sanctions? This question is very hotly contested, with many taking hard-line stances on either side. However, both sides acknowledge that there are pros and cons to each option. Many opponents of sanctions have begun to call them a form of genocide and cite the poor humanitarian situation in the country as the primary reason for lifting the sanctions. They believe that with their removal the standard of living for Iraqi citizens will improve. No longer would there be delays in oil-for-food contracts or the prohibition of dual-use items that are crucial components in the oil or farming industries. They point to the deteriorating infrastructure that apparently has at times prevented Iraq from producing the amount of oil allowed under the oil-for-food program (though caps on production have recently been lifted and the budget allowed for spare parts expanded). They argue that the ending of sanctions would allow Iraq to acquire items needed to repair its refineries, which were previously prohibited as dual-use items or held up in the contract approval process. If sanctions were lifted, Iraq would not be limited in conducting repairs, allowing it to enhance its oil production and thus be able to purchase more food and medicine for its population. As of 31 January 2000, the value of spare parts contracts on hold was $291 million, more than half of the $506 million in approved contracts. The UN Security Council has become increasingly concerned with the deterioration of Iraq's oil industry. Consequently, it was one of the subjects addressed at some length in its 24 March 2000 meeting (United Nations Noon Briefing Highlights 2000). Most advocating the ending of sanctions do have concerns about the development of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program. However, they argue (and the argument is supported by this author) that the current sanctions regime is almost completely ineffective in controlling Hussein's efforts to acquire such weapons, due to the amount of smuggling the sanctions have been unable to restrict. Moreover, with the termination of onsite inspections in 1998, it has become very difficult to determine Saddam's capabili- ties. Therefore, it is argued that the sanctions are accomplishing very little of their original purposes and only hurting the general public, not Hussein and his inner circle. Sanctions opponents give one more major reason for lifting the sanctions: it would deprive Saddam of a domestic political tool he employs to rally the population around himself and against the UN (particularly the U.S.). Supporters of the UN sanctions largely believe otherwise. They do not believe the lifting of sanctions would significantly improve the lives of the ordinary Iraqi. Hussein's current behavior is used as evidence that should sanctions be ended, he would not necessarily devote any of the additional resources that would become available to lessening the plight of the common Iraqi citizen. They argue that he would largely continue his present pattern of spending and use newly obtainable resources to develop his military, not repair the country's infrastructure or come to the aid of his starving citizens. In direct rebuttal to opponents of sanctions, supporters commonly state that Hussein has had the capacity to rebuild his oil facilities had he chosen to do so. Basarah, an illegal refinery, was destroyed in the 1998 strikes, yet the Iraqi regime had enough spare parts for its repair. However, the Iraqi government often claimed it was unable to meet oil-for-food production targets due to a lack of spare parts with which to repair the refineries. A major concern frequently voiced by proponents is the fear that the removal of sanctions will give Hussein a free reign to pursue a WMD program. While current sanctions have not completely prevented the dictator from the development of such weapons, the sanctions may have at least slowed it down and complicated it to a degree. Many supporters also view a lifting of sanctions as giving in to Saddam and admitting defeat. This is a step that some of them are unwilling to take. THE SANCTIONS REGIME: THE NEED TO EITHER STRENGTHEN OR END So what is the answer? After being involved in MIF operations at the U.S. Department of State for four months and conversing with numerous personnel involved in the process, this author believes that the sanctions regime cannot remain as is. It needs to be dissolved, or be reinforced to close the significant gaps that exist and became more effective. Perhaps if the enforcement side of the regime were given more teeth, the UN would be better able to prevent Hussein from illegally accumulating the large financial resources needed to develop weapons systems. Yet if they are to remain as they are currently, the author believes that sanctions should be lifted because they are doing very little to deny Hussein the resources he needs to pursue his main goals, though they may make his pursuit a little more difficult. The considerable resources employed in the region to enforce these sanctions would be better used elsewhere, if they are not allowed to be as effective as they are capable of being. Furthermore, though 32 |