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Show STANDING AT THE CROSSROADS: NATO IN THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY James Seaman If the economic partnership between the United States and Europe continues to develop into a rivalry, the military unity that NATO provides will become significantly more important in holding together the U.S.-European link. An alliance as close as the one between Europe and the United States cannot be taken for granted. The United States must work to maintain a substantial friendship with the countries of Europe. An enduring commitment to NATO is one of the strongest ways to accomplish this. NATO should also be recognized as a beneficial organization for its European members. For example, conflicts between Germany and France, Turkey and Greece, as well as Britain and Iceland have all been solved by commitment to one another as NATO allies (Henrikson 1995, 101). In fact, American commitment to NATO is in large part responsible for the forging of common European interests. Before the Cold War, Western Europe was never unified to the degree it has been under NATO. France and Germany, for example, were traditional enemies. NATO was a major reason for putting German and French nationalism aside and forging a mutual commitment between the two countries. Therefore, it can be said that NATO has done much more than simply deter the Soviet Union. By assuring the American-European partnership, by subverting traditional ties of European nationalism, and by forging a commitment to democracy and stability in the eastern half of the continent, NATO has proven to be an organization of substantial significance. To dissolve NATO would be to endanger far too many positive aspects of the alliance. INCLUDING THE RUSSIANS NATO's expansion eastward is viewed as a threat by Russia, but halting expansion would leave the organization void of crucial challenges and ideological commitments. Further, dissolving the alliance would cause a forfeiture of the numerous benefits, both to the United States and to Europe, of NATO membership. Only one viable policy option remains: to include Russia in future NATO expansion. This position is certainly controversial, and the process of including Moscow would require convincing many critics that such a move would be worthwhile. Therefore, it is necessary to refute the points of opposition to Russian inclusion in NATO and to understand how Russian membership in the organization would be beneficial to all parties involved. One of the major arguments against further NATO expansion is the cost of upgrading the military and intelligence capabilities of new NATO members. In February 1997, the Clinton Administration released a study suggesting that the inclusion of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in the alliance would cost between $27 billion and $35 billion from 1997 to 2007. The United States' share of the expansion was suggested to cost between $150 million and $200 million per year for the ten years following the expansion (Goldgeier 1999, 132). It is important to compare the cost of NATO expansion to the cost of defending new NATO members against a renewed, resurgent Russia. Ivan Eland prepared a Congressional Budget Office estimate in 1996 that included the possibility of a militarily resurgent Russia. According to these numbers, NATO expansion would likely cost $70 billion in the decade following enlargement (Goldgeier 1999, 132). Therefore, while expanding NATO institutionally to include a new member will require a hefty price-tag, this cost is dwarfed by what it will take for NATO to defend its Eastern European members against a future attack from a potentially strengthened and hostile Russia that is excluded from NATO. Consider the cost (in both dollars and lives) it took for America to wage the Cold War. Such a thought is sobering, and it makes a partnership with Russia much more attractive than the potential of a future confrontation with Moscow. Another argument against the expansion of NATO to include Russia is the notion that, institutionally, NATO will suffer the same fate as the United Nations. The UN is seen by many as a bloated bureaucracy that includes too many diverse interests to operate effectively. The argument is that continued NATO expansion, particularly the inclusion of Russia, will cause NATO to become just as ineffective as the UN. However, one can begin by examining the history of NATO expansion, realizing that past expansion has benefited the organization. The additions of Greece and Turkey in 1952, West Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982 have made the alliance stronger, not weaker. Much of the inefficiency in the UN derives from the gridlock of differing political interests. While its members have been concerned with political interests, NATO has always been primarily a military alliance, not a political organization. By its nature, NATO has not been prone to the level of stagnation and bureaucratic inefficiency plaguing the UN. However, the shifting of goals to include the encouragement of democracy and capitalism in Eastern Europe has introduced new roles for NATO. The key will be for NATO to adapt. Just as the organization adapted to include additional countries in the past, it must now grow into new changes. Working in NATO's favor is the fact that commitment to democracy and capitalism are a litmus test for potential NATO members. The pattern is to encourage political and economic homogeneity among members. The UN does not expect its members to meet such rigid qualifications, and thus the organization is racked by discord. For a country like Russia, where the United States has sought for a decade to promote democracy and capitalism, it only makes sense to offer NATO membership as an inducement. Many have raised the question of whether Russia is committed to democracy and capitalism. Perhaps we should ask whether the United States has been fully committed to democracy and capitalism in Russia. Beyond the examples of past NATO expansion, looking to other examples of European security organizations expand - 80 |