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Show HINCKLEY JOURNAL OF POLITICS SPRING 2001 In order for Gregg's jury to issue the death penalty, they were required to find him guilty of at least one, of a possible ten aggravating circumstances that intensified the nature of his crime. These factors included other felonies such as armed robbery and rape. Also under Georgia law, Gregg's death penalty conviction was guaranteed review by the Georgia Supreme Court to assure that the trial courts followed three specific guidelines: (1) "No arbitrary factor can tamper the decision of the jury." (2) "The evidence proves the existence of an aggravated circumstance in connection with the crime." (3) "The penalty is not excessive or disproportionate in relation to similar cases" (Lazarus 1998). The Supreme Court agreed with this Georgia statute and justified the jury's decision to give Gregg a death sentence. Here the first question about death penalty equality arises. The Furman decision showed the Justice's apprehension that the death penalty was not being issued according to equal procedural justice. Gregg showed that death penalty sentencing could be considered equal justice, when regulated with specific sentencing guidelines. The Court, however, decided not to specify any federal guidelines in its Gregg decision. Woodson v. North Carolina, which was issued the same day as Gregg in 1976, made the justice's decision against federal sentencing guidelines quite clear. "The two crucial indicators of evolving standards of decency respecting the imposition of punishment in our society-jury determinations and legislative enactments-conclusively point to the repudiation of automatic death sentences" (Woodson v. North Carolina 1976). The reasoning behind Woodson is the Supreme Court's desire to uphold the idea of federalism, which is defined as, "a system of political organization with several different levels of government coexisting in the same area, with the lower levels having some independent powers" (Oran's 2000). Thus, with respect for the separation of powers, the Supreme Court must leave the creation of federal sentencing guidelines to Congress. The Supreme Court has also indicated the need for state legislatures to maintain power in making capital punishment decisions. A set of federal sentencing guidelines in Gregg might have appeared to be an excess of nationalism and judicial activism on the Court's part. On the other hand, this lack of any universal guide was bound to cause inconsistencies in substantive justice, due to varying precedents among states. Under Woodson, the most heinous crimes can be committed in non death-penalty states without the defendant worrying about receiving a death sentence. Precedent varies even among state legislatures in death penalty states. The Gregg opinion does not establish standards on how to determine aggravating and mitigating circumstances, but it suggests that variables such as these must exist to provide equality in sentencing. Gregg also fails to explain to what degree aggravating and mitigating circumstances should affect a jury in making its decision, or how a jury should determine whether or not any special circumstances even exist. According to figures from year-end 1997, the death penalty statutes in participating states are all over the map. In Tennessee, Wyoming, and North Carolina, the defendant only needs to be convicted of first-degree murder in order to receive the death penalty; only a conviction of capital murder, which is defined as "something more than intentional killing," is needed for a person to be executed in New Hampshire (Sawyer v. Whitley 1992). On the flip side, eighteen aggravating factors must be found for a death sentence in Alabama and thirteen for a death sentence in Nevada. Most death penalty states require the jury to find at least one aggravating factor in addition to the capital crime in order to issue the death penalty. However, the lists of possible factors vary among these states, from as many as fifteen to as few as eight (Snell 1998). To resolve these inconsistencies, the Court would need to create federal sentencing guidelines; something Woodson forbids them from doing. The Tenth Amendment guarantees the states the right to create laws not already guaranteed in the constitution, as it proclaims: "the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people" (Lockhart et. al 1991). Since the Court has no universal guidelines to govern death penalty sentencing, they must evaluate the justice of each death penalty case according to different sentencing guidelines depending on the respective state. This creates a great deal of additional work for the Court and opens the door for inequality. Weeks v. Angelone 2000 is a recent example of the many death penalty cases the Court must evaluate individually. The Weeks case was heard in oral argument on December 6th, 1999. Lonnie Weeks was sentenced to die in Virginia for gunning down a highway patrolman during a late night traffic stop. He was on probation at the time for a 1992 drug conviction and had recently participated in a burglary and car theft. He was also driving a stolen car at the time of the shooting. The sentencing jury was informed of these aggravating factors in the Weeks case and they were told that the factors could be used in justifying a sentence of death. They were also told of a mitigating factor that pointed to Weeks's religious upbringing. The jury felt confused and wanted to ask the judge before deliberations if they were required to issue the death penalty to Weeks because the prosecution had proven without a doubt the existence of more than one aggravating factor. The jury wasn't sure if they were allowed by law to ignore the aggravating factors and instead show mercy on Weeks because of the one mitigating factor. The prosecution objected to the question and the judge sustained their objection. Instead of answering, the judge ordered the jury to re-read the state's sentencing instructions. The jury moved to deliberations and returned Weeks a sentence of death. All of Weeks's original appeals were denied at the state and federal level. He later petitioned the 4th District Court 37 |