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Show AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: PATH TO EQUALITY OR REVERSE DISCRIMINATION? Natalie A. Noel "Public education must be equally available to all regardless of race." Similarly, the judge commented that, "the Fourteenth Amendment could no longer be stretched to accommodate the needs of any race...The only safe rule is to treat all sides alike" (Ball 2000, 27). The remedy for the case resulted in DeFunis's immediate enrollment in UWSL for the class of 1974. However, the Washington State Supreme Court disagreed and reversed Judge Shorett's order, stating that racial classifications may be used for either of the purposes set forth by UWSL of: 1) remedying past national discrimination and 2) promoting the integration of the races. However, the two dissenters accepted DeFunis's argument that the Constitution is and must be "color-blind." Similarly, they argued "racial bigotry, will never be ended by exalting the political rights of one group or class over that of another. The circle of inequality cannot be broken by shifting the inequalities from one man to his neighbor" (Ball 2000, 28). Ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court considered an appeal to hear DeFunis v. Odegaard. In his appeal, DeFunis posed two questions: 1) "Is the affirmative action program in violation of the 'Equal Protection' clause because preference is given to certain racial minorities?" 2) "Is Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act violated because white applicants must meet different and more stringent standards than do persons of certain other races in obtaining admission?" (Ball 2000, 29). Ultimately, the Court did not answer these questions, but instead issued a brief per curiam opinion in which the Court majority of five remanded the case on account of mootness. (DeFunis was scheduled to graduate from UWSL the following June). However, the Court could not dodge the issue for long, as the same controversy over the use of affirmative action arose with regard to the University of California at Davis Law School. REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT DAVIS v. ALLAN BAKKE 1978 In 1973, thirty-two year old Caucasian, Vietnam marine veteran, Allan Bakke, challenged the University of California at Davis (UCD) Medical School's dual admission program. Like many universities and colleges at this time, UCD was attempting to increase the small number of minority admissions to its professional schools. Paralleling the DeFunis case, high scores on threshold tests were critical for admission because of the limited number of seats compared to the much larger number of qualified applicants. The university's dual admission program set aside sixteen places for minority students and the regular admission program required a minimum GPA whereas, there was no minimum GPA for minority applicants. Table 1 shows the considerable statistical disparity between those admitted under the two programs. The associate dean and chair of the admissions committee, Dr.George Lowery, argued that the "special admittees were qualified for medical school education; they were, however, just less qualified than the regular admittees" (Ball 2000, 52). MCAT MCAT Table 1 MCAT General GPA Science Verbal Quantitative Information (percentile*) (percentile) (percentile) (percentile) Regular/ Special R/S R/S R/S R/S 83/35 81/46 76/24 69/33 3.5/2.6 Bakke: 97 96 94 72 3.44 *For all, Regular, Special, and Bakke, percentiles are the two-year average (Bakke applied two years in a row) [Ball, Howard. 2000. The Bakke Case: Race, Education, & Affirmative Action p. 52] Bakke contended that the medical school's practice of setting aside 16 of the one hundred seats annually filled by first-year medical students solely for minority applicants was, in effect, reverse discrimination. This case also centered on whether or not the Constitution's Equal Protection Clause or Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibited a public university from using a quota-based or set-aside admissions policy for minority students. The first court to hear the Bakke case ruled in 1974 that, "The use of this program did substantially reduce the plaintiff's chances of successful admission to medical school for the reason that, since 16 places...were set aside for this special program, the plaintiff was in fact competing for one place, not in a class of 100, but in a class of 84, which reduced his chances for admission by 16 percent." In conclusion, the Yolo County Superior Court said, "No race or ethnic group should ever be granted privileges or immunities not given to every other race" (Ball 2000, 57). However, UCD successfully argued that Bakke would not have been accepted even without the 16 set-asides, citing his age (32) as one factor. Thus, the judge did not order that Bakke be admitted to UCD, but rather ordered the UCD admissions committee to reconsider Bakke's application without regard to either his or any other applicant's race. A half a year later in a 6-1 ruling, the California Supreme Court concurred that that UCD's preferential admissions policy violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The majority opinion stated that "The Equal Protection Clause applies 'to any person,' and its lofty purpose to secure equality of treatment to all, is incompatible with the premise that some races may be afforded a higher degree of protection against unequal protection than others" (Ball 2000, 59). Because at this time several universities in California had been implementing quota-based affirmative action programs with regard to admissions, a few months following the state Supreme Court ruling the California Board of Regents approved the filing of a petition of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. The question the regents posed was, When only a small fraction of thousands of applicants can be admitted, does the Fourteenth Amendment's "Equal Protection" clause forbid a state university professional school 10 |