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Show THE SANCTIONS DILEMMA: SADDAM vs. THE UN Amy DeFrank Iranian complicity, this has only escalated. In fact, the U.S. State Department estimated that in January 2000, smuggling reached 100,000 barrels per day, and that Baghdad earned over 25 million dollars in that month alone (Department of State 2000b). Oil prices and the number of smugglers have both soared in the intervening months. Thus, despite some impressive numbers when viewed on a stand-alone basis, the MIF has been largely unable to prevent Iraq from reaping major financial benefits from illegal trade. Saddam Hussein has thus profited greatly from smuggling. The considerable revenue he has gained through these means has been used to construct extensive personal palaces throughout the country and finance his personal guard. He has accumulated considerable personal wealth while enhancing his political position by focusing the attention of the international community on the poor humanitarian situation in his country and blaming it on the sanctions. Currently, the MIF does not possess the capacity to improve upon its performance. What would most greatly aid the MIF and significantly hinder smugglers would be an end to or significant reduction of Iranian complicity. The U.S. and UN must apply considerable political pressure on the Iranian government to crack down on smuggling, but both seem unwilling to press hard for fear of damaging slowly improving relations with Iran. In fact, in a U.S. State Department February 29, 2000 press conference cited several times in this paper, the issue of Iranian complicity was addressed. Then spokesperson James Rubin skirted the issue and used very conciliatory language toward Iran, a fact on which the reporters picked up and even commented (Department of State 2000b). Political sensitivities in the region may hinder the implementation of any changes. A similar situation exists with the UAE. Heightened pressure on the UAE to prosecute those criminals behind the smuggling would raise the cost of smuggling and increase the turnaround time of diverted vessels. However, before that option can be undertaken, efforts must first be made to ensure that other states would accept diverted vessels, should the UAE then decide to retaliate against such pressure. As we have seen, the effectiveness of the MIF has been hamstrung by a number of factors. Should all or some of the above proposals be pursued, it is likely that the enforcement of sanctions in the Gulf would improve dramatically (as has been the case in the past when Iran bowed to political pressure). Indeed, while proposals are regularly discussed, due to wavering support for sanctions even within the branches of the U.S. government resistance often arises to any new policies that would indicate a harder stance on sanctions. Thus the MIF appears largely ineffective, and without the previously discussed reforms, the cost of maintaining such a force seems to outweigh the limited services it is able to provide. Moreover, as a component of the sanctions regime, it is criticized for contributing to the humanitarian difficulties in Iraq. THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS: ARE SANCTIONS TO BLAME? Very few contest the fact that the current humanitarian situation in Iraq is dismal. However, there is copious disagreement over the bearer of the blame for the country's current state. Many cite the UN sanctions as the primary causative agent, a situation that Hussein exploits to his political advantage, both at home and abroad. Opponents of the sanctions point to hold-ups in oil-for-food contracts, the lack of food and medical supplies, the deteriorating infrastructure, and so on, as major factors contributing to the overall poor welfare of the Iraqi people. UN sanction supporters argue that Hussein earns hundreds of millions every year from smuggling operations, money he then spends on palaces and his personal guard rather than his starving population. In other words, proponents point to Hussein as the primary reason for the current condition of his people, while opponents place the blame on sanctions. While sanctions undoubtedly do contribute to the poor conditions in Iraq (as would be expected from such broadly based sanctions), it is also apparent that Hussein greatly exacerbates the problem. He clearly has the ability to improve the condition of his people to some degree if he so chooses. However, he can use their dismal situation to his political advantage in his push to have the sanctions lifted. The following section is a brief discussion of the current humanitarian crisis in Iraq, an analysis of the two opposing positions outlined above, and an argument for the lifting of sanctions. There can be little doubt that the humanitarian situation in Iraq is grave. After eight years of war with Iran, and ten years of virtual diplomatic and economic isolation from the international community beginning with its invasion of Kuwait, Iraq suffers from a variety of problems. Yet agreement ends there. Facts and studies are disputed by both sides who contend that the other side is misinterpreting data, or deliberately overlooking contradictory information. For example, a study released by the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) on August 12, 1999 revealed that the infant mortality rate for children under five years old has more than doubled in the past ten years in south and central Iraq. However, the study also indicates that the infant mortality rates have fallen to pre-war levels in the north. In Northern Iraq, the UN, rather than the Iraqi government, administers the oil-for-food program and sanction supporters point to this as evidence that it is Hussein who is to blame for the worsening situation (Department of State 2000c). Yet others claim that this discrepancy is not primarily due to the difference in who controls the program in the area, but rather due to a combination of factors. They point to benefits to the population from widespread overland smuggling across the borders in the north, the greater dependency of the south on an irrigation system that is largely deteriorating, and the greater presence of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the north (Economist 2000). Thus, the fact remains that mortality rates 30 |
