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Show TEN CHAIRS: NINE ARE LEATHER; ONE'S ELECTRIC. THE SUPREME COURT'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL JUSTICE IN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT Jackson Spencer Wixom outcome is likewise correct or fair, whatever it is, provided that the procedure has been properly followed" (Feinberg 1973). Substantive justice is more subjective in nature and ensures to every American "The basic law of rights and duties" (Oran's 2000). Substantive justice measures each case individually. To ensure both aspects of justice, the Court must apply law in a general sense to create precedent and follow established procedure. At the same time, the Court must apply the law in a personal sense to individual cases in order to supply substantive justice. The Supreme Court has and continues to encounter difficulties in covering both aspects of equal justice. Ethical questions surface that do not have clear answers. The intent of this paper is not to give answers, but to display the questions in order to better understand the Supreme Court's struggle towards equal justice. Questions such as these are what drive our country towards a better form of government. SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE OR AN ABUSE OF FEDERALISM Capital Punishment has traveled a bumpy road in the latter part of the twentieth Century. In 1971, the Supreme Court affirmed its blessing of capital punishment in McGautha v. California, when it "rejected petitioners' common claim that permitting the jury to impose the death penalty without any governing standards violated due process" (Lockhart et. al 1991). The issue caught fire one year later when the Supreme Court delivered its opinion in the case of Furman v. Georgia. Capital punishment in the United States ground to a halt with the Furman decision. A slim five to four majority, (Justices Stewart, White, Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall) wrote a basket of separate concurring opinions that together constituted the Court's majority opinion. The five justices backing Furman basically felt that the death penalty violated the "equal protection" and "cruel and unusual punishment" clauses of the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments, but each justice wanted to say this in his own way. For example, Justice Douglas concluded that the death penalty was given disproportionately to poor and socially disadvantaged defendants and was therefore a violation of "equal protection." Justice Stewart concluded that since Congress had failed to create a mandatory death sentence for certain types of capital crime, capital punishment occurred too randomly not to be considered "cruel and unusual" (Furman v. Georgia 1972). At the time of Furman, the Court was also reviewing petitions from cases in which juries had issued the death penalty for crimes other than homicide, crimes such as rape. The Court was also examining the constitutionality of capital sentencing that was carried out without any procedural clarification from the trial judge to the respective sentencing juries. The Furman majority decided that this form of free-for-all capital punishment sentencing was way out of hand. Justice Stewart felt the randomness of the death sentence under McGautha made it much like being "struck by lightning" (Hall 1992). In a majority of capital punishment cases, the defendant is sentenced to death in a state trial court. The case usually follows a designated state appeals process to the state Supreme Court. The case can then be appealed to the federal judiciary if the defendant can find a violation of his or her constitutional rights in the judicial process. In such a scenario, the case moves first to the Federal District Court, then to the Federal Circuit Court, and finally, to the United States Supreme Court; which makes the final determination in the case. When the Supreme Court issued its Furman decision, the Justices built a dam at the end of the previously explained appellate system. States continued to issue the death penalty and those convicted continued to follow the appeals process; however, Furman did not allow the death sentence to be carried out. Ironically, the Supreme Court's anti-death penalty sentiment lasted only five years before returning to the jurisprudence that drove McGautha. The death penalty dam was broken with the execution of Utah inmate Gary Gilmore. Gilmore was convicted on multiple counts of first-degree murder, the result of a one-night armed robbery rampage through Provo, Utah. For years, the State of Utah was unable to execute Gilmore because of the Supreme Court's decision in Furman. However, a little before noon on the January 17th, 1977 the Utah authorities were given the green light to execute Gilmore. The condemned man was led to a warehouse behind the Utah State Penitentiary; strapped into a chair and shot with one bullet through the chest. Gilmore's execution by firing squad became the first use of capital punishment in the United States since 1967. Gilmore's execution was legal due to the Supreme Court's decision in Gregg v. Georgia. With this decision, the Court's majority, (Justices Stewart, Powell, Stevens, White, Burger, and Rehnquist), reaffirmed the constitutionality of the death penalty. The Court rejected its earlier Furman claim that the use of the death penalty was too random and ungoverned to be constitutional. In the Gregg case, the Justices ruled that, "the concerns expressed in Furman that the penalty of death not be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner can be met by a carefully drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing authority is given adequate information and guidance" (Gregg v. Georgia 1976). Gregg, of Gregg v. Georgia, was originally convicted and sentenced to death on two counts of armed robbery and two counts of murder. Under the Georgia capital sentencing statute, the jury was properly informed on how to issue the death penalty. They were instructed to consider any mitigating circumstances related to Gregg's crimes, such as his young age, his cooperation with police, and his emotional state at the time of the offense. The jury could then use any of these circumstances as justification for lessening the degree of Gregg's punishment. 36 |
