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Show HINCKLEY JOURNAL OF POLITICS SPRING 2001 pie. The United States must realize the position it is in: a definite crossroads, with an opportunity to reach out to the Russians and recent and even centuries of hostility between Russia and the West as a whole. Unfortunately, America's current policy is to encroach on Russia's western protection zone. An opportunity exists to bring Russia into the community of Western nations. The current pattern of NATO expansion in the face of Russian reservations could deepen Russia's sense of being discriminated against and ignored. This pattern could certainly strengthen the position of Russian hypernationalists or other extremist groups who could rally sentiment against NATO expansion in order to discredit current Russian leadership and thereby hinder democratic changes in Russia (Kahl 1998, 22). POLICY OPTIONS If the current United States policy of supporting NATO's eastward expansion without the inclusion of Russia is a mistake, policy alternatives must be examined. One possibility is for the United States to support Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic as new NATO members, but then cease the endorsement of further NATO expansion which would further threaten Russia's western borders. Clearly, NATO cannot reverse the acquisition of the three former Warsaw Pact nations it has already included in the alliance. Sending a message to the Russians that further expansion is not desired, though, might lessen Moscow's fears of further Western expansion and aggression. In the sense that halting further expansion of NATO might allow for a stronger friendship between Russia and the West, this policy option has distinct benefits. NATO, however, cannot allow itself to become a stagnant organization. Like any organization, NATO needs solid goals and ideological commitments which will maintain the strength and will of its members. During the Cold War, NATO did not lack a mission because the perceived Soviet threat constantly forged a strong commitment from NATO's members. With the end of the Cold War, though, NATO was suddenly left with an ideological void. If communism and the Soviet threat no longer posed a significant challenge, what would be the purpose of NATO's existence? More specifically, NATO is a security alliance. Extinguishing NATO's primary security threat left the organization without a mission. In one sense, the collapse of communism and of the Soviet Union posed more of a threat to NATO's existence than the Red Army ever did. Without an ideological commitment and without a legitimate security challenge, NATO's members may lose their will to act. Thus the strength and legitimacy of the organization will erode, and NATO will either dissolve or exist as an impotent nominal organization. Maintaining the status quo does not give NATO the challenges it needs to forge renewed commitments from its members. Indeed, the viability of NATO, which currently depends on its systemic character, could be jeopardized unless the alliance expands (Henrikson 1995, 102). The answer to this problem exists in the two forms of NATO expansion mentioned earlier. One form of expansion is institutional, with the addition of Eastern European nations into the alliance. The second form of expansion is an increase of NATO's military role in Europe-specifically the peacekeeping actions being undertaken in the Balkan region. The institutional expansion certainly provides a new challenge to NATO, as the organization becomes committed to helping democracy and capitalism succeed in Eastern Europe. In fact, the enlargement of NATO shows the United States' willingness to use the military alliance as a means for accomplishing the political objective of encouraging the preferred pattern of development in the countries of Eastern Europe. NATO is now seen not solely as a military alliance, but a political instrument used to promote liberal democracy. In fact, Dariusz Rosati, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, said in 1996 that Poland wanted to join NATO for reasons other than defensive security. Rosati suggested Poland sought NATO membership "because we support the beliefs of NATO-a democratic society, preservation of human rights, and a free market economy" (Kahl 1998, 13). Therefore, the institutional expansion of NATO allows for an ideological expansion that gives the member countries of NATO the new challenges needed to forge the will to act. Clearly, the expansion of NATO gives the organization new challenges and ideological missions needed to keep the organization relevant. On the other hand, many have argued that searching for new roles to replace the Soviet threat is not constructive and that NATO should admit its usefulness has expired. It can be argued that NATO is the relic of a bygone, bipolar era, and the organization should therefore declare Cold War victory, and enter into retirement. Dissolving NATO would certainly be a solution to the problem of encroachment on Russia's western boundaries. Yet dissolving NATO would cause the United States to forfeit many of the benefits derived from membership in the organization. Dissolving NATO would, first of all, cut one of the strongest ties between the United States and Western Europe. The fifty year-old military alliance has left no doubt that the Americans and Western Europeans are committed to one another. The dissolution of NATO would cease this major form of American and European cooperation and mutual commitment. The United States has always viewed Europe as a vital economic and security interest in the world. The existence of NATO guarantees that this economically and strategically significant continent is a strong ally of the United States. The close ties between the United States and Europe are almost taken for granted. The emergence of a strong European Union (EU) could lead to the creation of European interests separate from those of the United States. The EU could potentially develop as a power to rival, or even threaten, the United States both economically and militarily. The current trend in Western Europe is to turn inward economically. Since the introduction of the Single Market in 1986, Western European countries trade more than ever with each other but less with the rest of the world (Coker 1998, 6). 79 |