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Show 88 THE DESCENT OF MAN. PART I. of distinction of this kind; though the distinction may be real. As far as exalted motives are concerned, many instances have been recorded of barbarians, destitute of any feeling of general benevolence towards mankind, and not guided by any religious motive, who have deliberately as prisoners sacrificed their lives/1 rather than betray their comrades ; and surely their conduct ought to be considered as moral. As far as deliberation and the victory over opposing motives are concerned, animals may be seen doubting between opposed instincts, as in rescuing their offspring or comrades from danger ; yet their actions, though done for the good of others, are not called moral. 1\foreover, an action repeatedly performed by us, will at last be done without deliberation or hesitation, and can then hardly be distinguished from an instinct; yet surely no one will pretend that an action thus done ceases to be moral. On the contrary, we all 'feel that an act cannot be considered as perfect, or as performed in the most noble manner, unless it be done impulsively, without deliberation or effort, in the same manner as by a man in whom t he requisite qualities are innate. He who is forced to overcome his fear or want of sympathy before he acts, deserves, however, in one way higher credit than the man whose innate disposition leads him to a good act without effort. As we cannot distinguish between motives, we rank all actions of a certain class as moral, when they are performed by a moral ~eing.. A moral being is one who is capable of companng his past and future actions or motives and of approving or disapproving of them. We ha;e no reason to suppose that any of the lower animals have 2 1 I have give~ one such case, namely of three Patagonian Indians wh? preferre~ be~g shot, one after the other, to betraying the plans of then· compamons m war(' Journal of Researches,' 1845, p. 103). Ci!AP. III. MORAL SENSE. 89 this capacity; therefore when a monkey faces danger to rescue its comrade, or takes charge of an orphanmonkey, we do not call its conduct moral. But in the case of man, who alone can with certainty be ranked as n moral being, actions of a certain class are called m01:al, whether performed deliberately after a struggle ~VIth opposing motives, or from the effects of slowly-gamed habit, or impulsively through instinct. But to return to our more immediate subject; although some instincts ~ are more powerful than others, thus leading to corresponding actions, yet it cannot be maintained that the social instincts are ordinarily stronger in man, or ha\e become stronger through long-continued habit, than the instincts, for instance, of self-preservation, hunger, lust, vengeance, &c. vVhy then does man regret, even though he may endeavour to banish any such regret, that he has followed the one natural impulse, rather than the other; and why does he further feel that he ought to regret his conduct? Man in this respect differs profoundly from the lower animals. Nevertheless we can, I think, see with some .deo-ree of clearness the reason of this difference. Man, from the activity of his mental faculties, cannot avoid reflection: past impressions and images are incessantly passing through his mind with distinctness. Now with those animals which live permanently in a body, the social instincts are ever present and persistent. Such animals are always ready to utter the danger-signal, to defend the community, and to give aid to their fellows in accordance with their habits; they feel at all times, without the stimulus of any .special passion or desire, some degree of love and sympathy for them; they are unhappy if long separated from them, and always happy to be in their company. .So it is with ourselves. A man who possessed no trace |
