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Show D2 1 THE DESCENT OF 1\IAN. PART I. vengeance. It is possible, or, as we shall hereafter see, even probable, that the habit of self-command may, like other habits, be inherited. Thus at last man comes to feel, through acquired and perhaps inherited habit, that it is best for him to obey his more persistent instincts. The imperious word ought seems merely to imply the consciousness of the existence of a persistent instinct, either innate or partly acquired, serving him as a guide, though liable to be disobeyed. We hardly use the word ought in a metaphorical sense, when we say hounds ought to hunt, pointers to point, and 1·etrievers to retrieve their game. If they fail thus to act, they fail in their duty and act wrongly. If any desire or instinct, leading to an action opposed to the good of others, still appears to a man, when recalled to mind, as strong as, or stronger than, his social instinct, he will feel no keen regret at having followed it; but he will be conscious that if his conduct were known. to his fellows, it would meet with their disapprobatiOn; and few are so destitute of sympathy as not to feel discomfort when this is realised. If he has no such sympathy, and if his desires leading to bad actions are at the time strong, and when recalled are not overmastered by the persistent social instincts, then he is essentially a bad man; 22 and the sole restrainino- motive left is the fear of punishment, and the conviction that in the long run it would be best for his own selfish interests to regard the good of others rather than his <>wn . . It is obvious that every one may with an easy consCience gratify his own desires, if they do not interfere • 22 Dr. ProsRer Despin.e, in his 'Psychologie Naturelle,' l 868 (tom. 1. p. 243; tom n. p. 169) giVes many curious cases of the worst criminalwho apparently have been entirely destitute of conscience. ,, Cu.AP. III. :M:ORAL SENSE. 93 with his social instincts, that is with the good of others; but in order to be quite free from self-reproach, or at least of anxiety, it is almost necessary for him to avoid the disapprobation, whether reasonable or not, of his fellow men. Nor must he break through the £xed habits of his life, especially if these are supported by reason; for if he does, he will assuredly feel dissatisfaction. Re must likewise avoid the reprobation of the one God or gods, in whom according to his knowledge or superstition he may believe; but in this case the additional fear of divine punishment often supervenes. The strictly Social Vi1·tues at first alone regarded.The above view of the £rst origin and nature of the moral sense, which tells us what we ought to do, and of the conscience which reproves us if we disobey itJ accords well with what we see of the early and undeveloped condition of this faculty in mankind. The virtues which must be practised, at least generally, by rude men, so that they may associate in a body, are those which are still recognised as the most important. But they are practised almost exclusively in relation to the men of the same tribe; and their opposites are not regarded as crimes in relation to the men of other tribes. No tribe could hold together if muruer, robbery, treachery, &c., were common; consequently such crimes within the limits of the same tribe "are branded "with everlasting infamy;" 23 but excite no such sentiment beyond these limits. A North-American Indian is well pleased with himself, and is honoured by others, when he scalps a man of another tribe; and a Dyak 23 See an able article in the' North British Review,' 1867, p. 3!)5 . See also l\1r. W. Bagehot's articles on the! Importance of Obedience and Coherence to Primitive Man, in the 'Fortnightly Review,' 1867, p. 529, and 1868, p. 457, &c. |