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Show 70 THE DESCENT OF MAN. PART I. CHAPTER III. CoMPARISO~ oF THE MENTAL PoWERS OF MAN AND THE LoWER ANIMALS-continued. The moral sense -Fundamental proposition- The qualities of social animaJs- Origin of sociability- Struggle between opposed instincts- Man a social animal-The more en.durina social instincts conquer other less persistent instincts- The social virtues alone regarded by savages~ The self-regarding virtues acquired at a later stage of development- The importance of the judgment of the members of the same community on conduct- Transmission of moral tendencies - Summary. I FULLY subscribe to the judgment of those writers 1 who maintain that of all the differences between man and the lower animals, the moral senRe or conscience is by far the most important. This sense, as Mackintosh 2 remarks, "has a rightful supremacy over every " other principle of human action;" it is summed up i~ t~at short but. imperious word ought, so full of high s1gm:ficance. It IS the most noble of all the attributes of man, leading him without a moment's hesitation to risk his life for that of a fellow-creature; or after due. deliberation, impelle~ sim~ly_ by the deep feeling of nght ?r duty, to sacrifice It m some great cause. Immanuel Kant exclaims, '1 Duty! Wondrous thought "that workest neither by fond insinuation, flattery no;. "by any threat, but merely by holdinO' up thy n~ked "} . h l 0 aw m t e sou, and so extorting for thyself always 1 Se.e, f?r instance, on this subject, Quatrefages, 'Unite de l'Espcce Humame, 1861, p. 21, &c. 2 'Dissertation on Ethical Philosophy,' 1837, p. 231, &c. CHAP. III. MOltAL SENSE. 71 "reverence, if not always obedience; before whom all " appetites are dumb, however secretly they rebel; " whence thy original?" 3 This great question has been discussed by many writers4 of consummate ability ; and my sole excuse for touching on it is the impossibility of here passing it over, and because, as far as I know, no one has approached it exclusively from the side of natural history. The investigation possesses, also, some independent interest, as an attempt to see how far the study of the lower animals can throw light on one of the highest psychical faculties of man. The following proposition seems to me in a high degree probable-namely, that any animal whatever, endowed with well-marked social _instincts,~ would inevitably acquire a moral sense or conscience, as soon as 3 'Metaphysics of Ethics,' translated by J. W. Semple, Edinburgh, 1836, p. 136. 4 Mr. Bain gives a list ('Mental and Moral Science,' 1868, p. 543- 725) of twenty-six British authors who have written on this subject, .and whose names are familiar to every reader; to these, Mr. Bain's own name, and those of Mr. J. .. ecky, Mr. Sbadworth Hodgson, and Sir J. Lubbock, as well as of others, may be added. 6 Sir B. Brodie, after observing that man is a social animal (' Psychological Enquiries,' 1854, p. 192), asks the pregnant question, " ought not this to settle the disputed question as to the existence of a "moral sense?" Similar ideas have probably occurred to many persons, .as they did long ago to Marcus .Aurelius. Mr. J. S. Mill speaks, in his celebrated work, 'Utilitarianism,' (186>4:, p. 4G), of the social feelings as a "powerful n.atural sentiment," and as "the natural basis of "sentiment for utilitarian morality;'' but on the previous page be says, " if, as is my own belief, the moral feelings are not innate, but " acquired, they are not for that reason less natural." It is with hesitation that I venture to differ from so profound a thinker, but it can hardly be disputed that the social feelings are instinctive or innate in the lower animals; and why should they not be so in man? :Mr. Bain (see, for instance,' The Emotions and the Will,' 1865, p. 481) -aud others believe that the moral sense is acquired by each individual during his lifetime. On the general theory of evolution this is at least extremely improbable. |
