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Show 86 THE DESCENT OF :M:AN. PART I. scale are guided almost exclusively, and those which stand higher in the scale are largely guided, in the aiel which they give to the members of the same community, by special instincts; but they are likewise in part impelled by mutual love and sympathy, assisted apparently by some amount of reason. Although man, as just remarked, has no special instincts to tell him how to aid his fellow-men, he still bas the impulse, and with his improved intellectual faculties would naturally be much guided in this respect by reason and experience. Instinctive sympathy would, also, cause him to value highly the approbation of his fellow-men; for, as Mr. Bain has clearly shewn,20 the love of praise and the strong feeling of glory, and the still stronger horror of scorn and infamy, "are due to the workings of sympathy." Consequently man would be greatly influenced by the wishes, approb~tion, and blame of his fellow-men, as expressed by their gestures and language. Thus the social instincts, which must have been acquired by man in a veTy rude state, and probably even by his early ape-like progenitors, still give the impulse to many of his best actions ; but his actions are largely determined by the expressed wishes and judgment of his fellow-men, and unfortunately still oftener by his own strono- selfish desires. But as the feelings of love and symp0~thy and the . power of self-command become strengthened by hab1t, and as the power of reasoning becomes clearer so t~at. man can appreciate the justice of the judgments of h1s fellow-men, he will feel himself impelled, independently of any pleasure or pain felt at the moment to certain li_nes of conduct. He may then say, I am 'the supreme Judge of my own conduct, and in the words of Kant, I will not in my own person violate the dignity of humanity. 20 'Mental and Moral Science,' 1868, p. 254. CHAP. III. MORAL SENSE. 87 The more enduring Social Instincts conquer the less Persistent Instincts.-We have, however, not as yet considered the main point, on which the whole question of the moral sense hinges. vVhy should a man feel that he ought to obey one instinctive desire rather than another? Why does he bitter1y regret if he has yielded to the strong sense of self-preservation, and has not risked his life to save that of a fellow-creature; or why does he regret having stolen food from severe hunger? It is evident in the first place, that with mankind the instinctive impulses have different degrees of strength; a young and timid mother urged by ~he. maternal instinct will, without a moment's hesitatiOn, run the greatest danger for her infant, but not for a mere fellow- creature. l\fany a man, or even boy, who never before risked his life for another, but in whom courage and sympathy were well developed, has, disregarding the instinct of self-preservation', instantaneously plunged into a torrent to save a drowning fellow-creature. In this case man is impelled by the same instinctive motive, which caused the heroic little American monkey, formerly described, to attack the great and dreaded baboon, to save his keeper. Such actions as the above appear to be the simple result of the greater strength of the social or maternal instincts than of any other instinct or motive; for they are performed too instantaneously for reflection, or for the sensation of pleasure or pain; though if prevented distress would be caused. I am aware that some persons maintain that actions performed impulsively, as in the above cases, do not come under the dominion of the moral sense, and cannot be called moral. They confine this term to actions done deliberately, after a victory over opposing desires, or to actions prompted by some lofty moti:e· But it appears scarcely possible to draw any clear line |