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Show 10-1 THE , DESCENT OF MAN. PAt:T I. between the various instincts of the lower animals, it is not surprising that there should be a struggle in man between his social instincts, with theie derived virtues, and his lower, though at the moment, stronger impulses or desires. This, as l\fr. Galton 38 has remarked, is all the less surprising, as man has emerged from a state of barbarism within a comparatively recent period. After having yielded to some temptation we feel a sense of dissatisfaction, analogous to that felt from other unsatisfied instincts, called in this case conscience ; for we cannot prevent past imnges and impressions continually passing through our minds, and these in their weakened state we compare with the ever-present social instincts, or with habits gained in early youth and strengthened during our whole lives, perhaps inherited, so that they are at last rendered almost as strong as instincts. Looking to future generations, there is no cause to fear that the social instincts will grow weaker, and we may expect that virtuous habits will grow stronger, becoming perhaps fixed by inheritance. In this case the struggle between our higher and lower impulses will be less severe, and virtue will be triumphant. Summary of the two last Chapters.-There can be no doubt that the difference between the mind of the lowest man and that of the highest animal is immense. An a~thropo~orphous ape, if he could take a dispassionate VIew of hrs own case, would admit that though he could form an artful plan to plunder a garden-though he could use stones for fighting or for breaking open nuts, effect. Ur. Lecky (' Ilist. of Morals,' vol. i. p. 143) seems to a certain exte11t to coincide. r 38 See his remarkable work on 'Hereditary Genius,' 1869, p. 3-19. The Duke of Argyll ('Primeval 1\Ian,' 18ti9, p. 188) has some "'OOJ remarks on tlte contest in man's nature between right aud wrong. "' CIIAP. III. SUl\IMARY. 105 yet that the thought of fashioning a stone into a tool was quite beyond his scope. Still less, as he would admit, could he follow out a train of metaphysical reasoning, or solve a mathematical problem, or reflect on God, or admire a grand natural scene. Some apes, however, would probably declare that th~y could and. did admire the beauty of the coloured skm and fur of their partners in marriage. They would admit, t~at though they could make other apes understand by Cl?es some of their perceptions and simpler wants, the notiOn of expressing definite ideas by definite sounds had never crossed their minds. They might insist that they were ready to aid their fellow-apes of the same troop in many ways, to risk their lives for them, and to take charge of their orphans ; but they would b~ ~orced to acknowledO"e that disinterested love for all hvmg creatures, the ~ost noble attribute of man, was quite beyond their comprehension. Nevertheless the difference in mind between man and the higher animals, great as it is, is certainly one of degree and not of kind. vVe have seen that the senses and intuitions, the various emotions and faculties, such as love, memory, attention, curiosity, imitation, reason, &c., of which man boasts, may be found in an incipient, or even sometimes in a well-developed condition, in the lower animals. They are also capable of some inherited improvement, as we see in the domestic dog compared with the wolf or jackal. If it be maintained that certain powers, such as self-consciousness, abstraction, &c., are peculiar to man, it may well be that these are the incidental results of other highlyadvanced intellectual faculties-; and these again are mainly the result of the continued use of a highly developed language. At what age does the new-bor~ infant possess the power , of abstraction, or become self- A.-· .. , .',. |
