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Show ()4 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. cisc of those powers? Could they preserve the peace of the greater States and repnblics? Or, where were they obeyed? llistory shows that their decrees were disrc. garued, and that the stronger States, regardless of their power, gave law to the lesser. Let us examine the Federal Institutions of Germany. It was instituted upon the laudable principle of securing th~ independency of the several States of which it was composed, and to protect them against foreign invasion. llas it answered these good intentions? Do we not sec that their councils are weak and distracted, and that it cannot prevent the wars and confusions which the respective electors carry on against each other? The Swiss Cantons, or the IIclvetic Union, arc equally insufficient. Such are the lessons which the experience of others affords us and from whence results the evident conclusion that all I Federal Governments arc weak and distracted. 1'o avoid the evils deducible from these observations, we must establish a general and national government, completely sovereign, and annihilate the State distinctions and State operations; and unless we do this, no good purpose can be a11swered. What does the J crsey plan propose? It surely bas not this for its object. By this we grant the regulations of trade and a more effectual collccLion of the revenue, and some partial duties. TL1CSC, at five or ten per cent., would only perhaps amount to a fund to discharge the debt of the corporation. Let us take a review of the variety of important objects which must necessarily engage the attention of a national government. You have to protect your rights against Canada on theN ortb, Spain on the South, and your western frontier against the savage·, you have to adopt necessary plans for the settlement of your frontiers, and to institute the mode in which settlements and good governments are to be made. TilE FEDEHAL CONV.KKTION. 65 IIow is the expense of supporting and regulating these t~porlant ma.ticrs to be defrayed ? By rcq ui itiun on the SLates according to the J erscy plan ? Will this do it. Wo have already found it ineil'cctual. Let one state prove delinquent, and it will encourage others to follow the example; and thus the whole will fail. Aud what is the ta11danl uy which to quota amono- the States their respective proportions? Can lands be the standard? liow woul(l that apply between Russin. and llolland ? Com pare PennsylVf. l.ll ia. with North Carolina, or Counccti ·ut w iLh New York. Docs not commerce or industry in the one or the other make a great disparity, between these different connlrics, and may not tbc comparative Yaluc of the States, from these circnmstallccs, make an unequal disproportion when the data arc numbers? I therefore conclude that either system would ultimately destroy the Confederation, or any other govcrnmcn t which is established on such fallacious principles. Perhaps imposts-taxes on specific articles-would produce a more equal ·ystem of drawing a revenue. Another objection against the J crscy plan is, the unequal repro ·entation. Can the great States consent to this? If they diu, it would eventually work its owu destruction. How arc forces to be raised by the Jersey plan? By quotas? Will the States comply with the requisition? As much as they will with the taxes. Examine the present Confederation, and it is evident they can rai c no troops, and equip no vessels, before war is actually declared. 'l'hcy cannot, therefore, take any preparatory measure before an enemy is at your door. IIow unwise and inadequate their powers! .And this must ever be the ca.e when you attempt to define powers; something wi1l alwayf3 be wauting. Congress, by being a11nually elcclc<l, and subject to rerall, will ever come with the prejuL1iccs of their States, ru.ther than the good of the Union. Adu therefore, additional powers to a body organized, and 5 |