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Show 62 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. stress on the terms sole and e.rp1·es:, as if these words in. tend 'U n. confinement to n. federal government, when the mn.nife t import is no more than that the institution of a good government must l>e the sole and e:rp14 ess object of your deliberations. Nor can we suppose an annihilation of our powers by forming a national government, as many of the States have made in their con. titutions no proper provisions for any alterations, aud thus much I can say for the State I have the honor to rcprescn t, that when our credentials were under consideration in the Senate, some memucrs were for iuscrti11g a restriction in the powers, to prevent an encroachment on the constitution: it was answered by others, and thereupon the resolve carried on the credentials, that it might abridge the constitutional powers of the State, and that possibly in the formation of a new Union, it would be found necessary. This seems reasonaulc, and leaves liS at liberty to form such a national gOV· ernment as we think best a(lapte<l to the whole. I have therefore no difficulty as to the extent of our powers, nor do I feel my elf restrained in the exercise of my judgment under them. ....,N e can only propose and recommend ;-the power of ratifying or n'jcctiug is still in the States. But on this great queslion I am still embarrassed. I have be· fore ob ·erved my apprehension of the inefficacy of either plan, and I havo doubls whether a more energetic govern· mcnt can pervade this wide and cxtensi vc country. I shall now show that both plans arc materially defective. 1. A good government o·ught to be constant, and ought to contain an aclive principle. 2. Utility and necessity. 3. An habitual sense of obligation. 4. :Force. 5. Influ· cnce. I hold it that di(l'crcnt societies have all different views and inlcrcsls to punmc, and always prefer local to general concerns. Por example, the N cw York Legisla· ture made an external compliance lately to a rcquisiLion of Congress; but do they not, at the same time, counteract THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 63 their compliance by gratifying the local objects of tho State, so as to defeat their conce : ion ? And this will ever be tbe case. l\-1en always love power, and States will prefer v theit· particular concerns to the gen ral welfare; and as the ta.tcs become large and important, will they not be less attentive to the general govcmmcnt? vYhat, in pro-cess of time, will Vit·giuia be ? She contains now half o. million inhabitants; in twenty-five years she will donblo that number. }..,eeling her own weight and importance, rnnst she not become indifl'crcut to tho concerns of the Union? And where h1 such o. itnalion will be found na.Lional attachment to the general government? By forre I mean the coercion or law and the coercion of arm:. Will thL remark apply to the power invested to be inslitu1 cd by their plan ? A delinquent mnst bo compelled to obedience by force of arms. JT ow is this to be <lone? If you arc unsncces. ful, o. dissolution of your government must be the consequence; and in that case the individual legislatures will resume their powers; nay, will not tho interests of the Slates be thrown into the State governments? By injlttence I mean the regular weight and support it will receive from those who find it their interest to support a government intended to preserve the peace and happiness of the community on the whole. rrho State governments, by either plan, will exert tho means to counteract it. They have their State judcres and militia, all combined to support thrir State interests; and these will be influenced to oppose a national government. Either plan therefore is precarious. The national government cannot long exist, opposed by so weighty a rival. The experience of ancient and modern confcclerucics evinces this point, and throws considerable light on the subject. The .Amphictyonic council of Greece had o. right to require of its members troops, money, and the force of the country. Were they obcycu in the exer- |